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ABSTRACT
Stereosat, a free flying sun synchronous satellite whose purpose is to
obtain worldwide cloud—free stereoscopic images of the Earth's land masses,
had been proposed as a joint private sector/government venture. A number of
potential organizational models were identified. The legal, economic, and
institutional issues which could impact the continuum of potential joint
private sector/government institutional structures were examined. The
conclusion reached was that a number of organizational models could meet the
sometimes conflicting policy objectives of the government and the private
sector. While some legal, economic, and institutional issues impacted the
choice of institutional structure, none barred any model.
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Dr. Charles F. Hutchinson.
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The Stereosat Policy Study was undertaken over a period in which the
confluence of a number of forces both within government and the private sector
resulted in significant changes in the United States civilian land remote
sensing program. The Stereosat Program can most easily be understood when
viewed against the backdrop of this movement towards an integrated civilian
land remote sensing system.
Civilian land remote sensing from space began with the launch of
Landsat-1 on July 23, 1972, followed by a similar Landsat-2 on January 22,
1975. Landsat-1 and Landsat-2 detect solar radiation reflected from the
Earth's surface in visible and near-visible wavelengths using a multispectral
scanner (MSS). Landsat-3, launched March 5, 1978, detects emitted thermal
radiation in addition to reflected radiation. All thrcc Lardsets were
designed as research and development satellites and were not intended to
provide continuous data. They were proof-of-concept research activities.
Landsat-1 ceased operation on January 10, 1978, after almost five years of
continuous operation. Landsat-2 ceased data collection in November 1979, but
efforts are under way to correct the problems. Landsat-3 continues to collect
data but has been experiencing problems with its tape recorders. All cf these
satellites have continued to operate well beyond their nominal lives.
It is this continued operation of Lard sat-1, -2, and -3 beyond their
nominal lives that is the genesis of some of the impetus towards an integrated
operational remote sensing system. An integral part of the Landsat program
i
has been funding of scientists to experiment with remote sensing data to
develop new applications, and the creation of regional remote sensing training
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and user assistance centers to transfer this technology to a wider spectrum of
users. 'These efforts may be judged a success because a large user community
has developed which relies on Landsat. Some users benefit from the high
altitude synoptic perspective; others from seeing the same spot on the earth
every eighteen days.
As the user community grew and the potential applications of Landsat data
increased, both in the United States and in foreign countries, users became
aware of the inherent limitations of the existing Landsat satellites. While
some users had become dependent on a steady flow of data, the satellites grew
older, each operating beyond its design life. The prospect of an interrupt-
ible flow of data led to expressions of concern to both the executive and
legislative branches of government, each of which responded differently.
In 1977, in the Ninety-Fifth Congress, Senate Bill 657, the Earth
Resources and Environment Information System Act, was introduced with the
objective of establishing a remote sensing system. The executive branch
opposed passage because they felt the legislation was premature. S.657 was
not reported out of committee.
Two years later, in the Ninety-Sixth Congress, two bills were introduced
to create an operational remote sensing system. Senate Bill 663, the Earth
Data and Information Service Act of 1979 9 would create an agency within the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to acquire, process and
disseminate Earth resources data until an appropriate institutional mechanism
is defined to transfer this activity to the private sector. Senate Bill 8759
the Earth Resources Information Corporation Act of 1979, would establish a
private corporation to operate a commercial Earth resources information
service. Hearings have been held on the bills and both remain under
consideration.
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In June, 1978 0 the President issued Presidential Directive/NSC-37,
entitled "National Space Policy", stating the principle that the United States
would develop and operate active and passive remote sensing operations on a
global basis. FD-37 also created a National Security Council (NSC) Policy
Review Committee (PRC) to formulate a civil space policy to encompass the
concepts of domestic commercial exploitation of space and the widest practical
dissemination of data from civil space programs.
The studies undertaken by PRC (Space) led the President to announce a
U.S. Civil Space Policy in October, 1978. The President committed the United
States to "continuity of data" from the Landsat system, and directed NASA and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOM) to prepare a plan
"to encourage private investment and direct participation in civil remote
sensing systems." The study which was to be the basis for the plan, "Private
Sector Involvement in Civil Space Remote Sensing Systems" (PSIS), released
June 15, 1979, concluded that it was premature to select specific
institutional mechanisms for transferring Landsat to the private sector.
Continuing studies by PRC (Space) resulted in Presidential Directive/
NSC-54, entitled "Civil Operational Remote Sensing," assigning management
responsibility for civil operational land remote sensing activities to NOM.
In assuming that responsibility, NOAA wao to prepare a transition plan and
seek further private sector involvement. NOAA released a document discussing
issues and options for planning a civil operational land remote sensing
satellite system on June 20, 1980.
The original idea for Stereosat as an independent mission complementing
Landsat was presented to NASA in the middle of 1976. Preliminary studies
demonstrated the scientific and technical viability of the mission. As the
mission was configured, however, it went beyond traditional research and
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development. At the same time, membe-s of the potential Stereosat user
community were saying that Stereosat might be a viable commercial activity.
The result was that NASA, in its mission studies in Fiscal Year 1179 and
continuing Fiscal Year 1980, began to investigate the potential of joint
private sector/government implementation of Stereosat.
The Stereosat Policy Study Task commenced in April 1979. The Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), in its role as the Stereosat Project Manager, was
asked to investigate the potential for joint private sector/government
involvement in Stereosat. It should be recalled that the Private Sector
Involvement Study (PSIS) was released in June 1979, and PD-54 issued in
November 1979. This study was being undertaken in a time of considerable
uncertainty about the future of :ivil remote sensing. A commitment had been
made to "continuity of data" and to increased private sector involvement, but
the extent and form of these commitments were unknown. Thus, while some
segments of the user community were advocating immediate implementation of
Stereosat, others were adopting a "wait- and-see" attitude until more was known
about the full scope of civil remote sensing systems.
A fundamental issue which became evident in this study was the perception
of the commercial viability of Stereosat as a necessary precondition to
private sector involvement. If Stereosat had proceeded towards implemen-
tation, private sector corporations likely to consider participation with the
government would be described as mature. For the purposes of this discussion,
a mature corporation may be described as one established i« its markets with a
relatively secure level of -arnings and a commitment to earnings growth
through investment. Mature corporations attempt to minimize risks which may
hamper a relatively steady growth in earnings. For this reason, the mature
corporation attempts to reduce the uncertainty associated with any of the
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factors of productiin or demand. Market studies are a manifestation of this
desire; the corporation wants to be as certain as possible a market for the
product exists before investing its capital. Examples of this are the
recurrent requests by potential private sector investors in Landsat or
Stereosat for the government to define its own market for imagery. That is,
how much data over what period and at what price is the government going or
willing to purchase. Taken to its logical extreme, the private sector would
like to have a firm purchase commitment because that eliminates uncertainty
about the revenues which would be derived from government purchases of data.
Revenues are determined by the price charged and the number of units
sold. Traditional market analysis techniques often yield reasonable estimates
of the number of units which could be sold. These market projections are
often extrapolations based on sales of similar items. Some projection of
expected Stereosat sales based on the Landsat sales listing are discussed
below.
A more difficult proolem is the price to be charged, and demand
sensitivity to price. Economic theory says that the price charged for a
product should reflect ite value. Virtually everyone agrees that Stereosat
imagery would be a valuable addition to existing data bases, that is,
Stereosat imagery would be useful. The question remains, however, how such
these users would have been willing to pay to obtain Stereosat imagery.
Stereosat imagery would be information, information that would be of
value in a number of applications. The economic value of this information
would be hard to determine. One example may reveal the complexity of the
problem. Stereosat imagery would have supported non-renewable resource
exploration in at least two ways, each of which could be considered as
contributing to its value. First, Stereosat imagery would have provided
Fir
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additional information about a particular area. Additional information has
value. Second, Stereosat imagery would have provided a synoptic framework for
organizing other data which may have led to additional information being
extracted from this existing data. The value of Stereosat here would have
been derived from other valuable information. Both of these uses of Stereosat
imagery could have contributed to a higher probability of success in
exploration. An onshore well today car. cost millions of dollars. If
Stereosat images could increase the probability of success even a few percent,
those images would have significant value. The particular images which could
be identified as having contributed to specific producing wells would have
high value. The value attributed to success must be allocated across all
images because the value of particular images cannot be determined a priori.
Theoretically, the price to be charged for the images used in nonrenewable
resource exploration should reflect their value in that application. In other
applications, Stereosat images would have different value.
It is easy to discuss value in the abstract and argue for an economic
pricing scheme. In fact, however, the r^nges of applications where Stereosat
images could be useful have only tentatively been identified. Potential us-ars
probably could not articulate the value of Stereosat images in their
applications today any more than early Landsat users could foretell its
potential use. Admittedly, almost a decade of experience with Landsat should
make analogizing easier and somewhat more reliable. But, as was true with
Landsat, the value of Stereosat images in the hands of users probably cannot
be ascertained with confidence until after they have had an opportunity to use
the images in their particular application.
The question, fundamentally, was whether there was enough confidence in
the existence of a market for Stereosat images to attract investment, both
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from the private sector and from government. Neither sector has been able to
quantitatively assess the market. That large uncertainty, coupled with the
emphasis on evolving an operational remote sensing system, has created a
reluctance on the part of both the government and the private sector to invest
in Stereosat.
This document was drafted and revised a number of times. Each revision
attempted to accommodate the then current status of Stereosat as a program
within NASA and the overall civil remote sensing program. The result is that
some portions of the document reflect earlier ideas which are now
inappropriate given the evolution of the Undsat system towards an operational
system. These ideas are discussed here not for the current viability, but






 was a proposed satellite system whose purpose was to obtain
worldwide cloud-free stereoscopic images of the Earth's land masses.
Stereosat would provide for the first time a consistent data set covering the
entire Earth, both in traditional photographic images and as digital computer
compatible tapes ( CCT's). Stereoscopic photo imagery is today used in a large
number of applications including petroleum and mineral exploration,
engineering geology and hydrology, photogrammetry, and other applications.
Thus, the photographic image products from the Stereosat mission would have
been readily integrable into an existing geosciences industry. Having the
stereoscopic image data available in CCT form meant that this data could be
computer merged with existing data bases such as Landsat and others. The
technology for this computer image merging and the extraction of useful
information from the :_.erged data is in its infancy, and Stereosat would have
encouraged its growth and development. See Appendix 1.
Some people both within and outside government have advocated a policy
with respect to space remote sensing that where a readily identifiable segment
of the private sector is the ?rimary beneficiary of an activity, that sector
should participate fully with the government in the cost of development and
implementation of the particular project. This policy has been interpreted by
1	 A detailed description of the Stereosat mission may be found in the
Preliminary Stereosat Mission Description, JPL Report No. 720-33,
prepared by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), May 30, 1979, hereinafter




some to mean that the private sector should contribute to up front
expenditures. The traditional mode of private sector involvement in space
remote sensing has been as government contractors providing spacecraft
systems, launch vehicles, and the like. In the Landsat series of satellites,
the government has paid the cost of the satellite, launch, and continuing
operations, and sells the data to individuals in the private sector for the
cost of reproduction. Since the underlying rationale for those missions has
primarily been scientific and proof of concept, this institutional model has
been appropriate. Where the satellite system would be dedicated to an
identifiable group in the private sector, this policy would mean that the
beneficiaries would be expected to contribute to the implementation of the
project, that is, the processors of the data, value added processors, and
utimately the users.
Stereosat was the first space remote sensing mission which appeared to
have a specifically identifiable private sector end user. Some segments of
the government have also appeared to have an interest in obtaining Stereosat
data. Although a number of private sector users have strongly advocated that
NASA proceed to implement Stereosat, they acknowledge that the market for
stereo imagery has been perceived as very uncertain. With this perception the
private sector appeared reluctant to invest in space remote sensing up front.
However, segments of the private sector expressed willingness to purchase the
data once it becomes available. The problem presented to the government was
twofold. First, the government had to determine whether Stereosat had net
positive benefits to the United States, a question of value. If it were
concluded by the government that implementing Stereosat was in the best
interests of the United States, then the government would have to have created
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an institutional structure which involved the private sector in implementing
Stereosat.
This study examines two broad questions:
0	 What is the value of Stereosat? What is the social value and the
social cost of having this stereoscopic data available to the
country as a whole? And, what is the private value and the private
cost of this data? A fundamental issue here is the potential market
for the data products.
•	 What are the legal, economic, political, and institutional
constraints which would impinge upon any potential joint private
sector/government structure created to implement Stereosat?
The approach of this study has been to identify the issues within each of
these questions which must be addressed prior to the federal government
actually creating an institutional arrangement for joint private
sector/government participation in Stereosat.
It should be noted at the outset that the scope of this study has, of
necessity, been constrained by the main objective of identifying those issues
which would have to be resolved prior to decision by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) to proceed with any joint private sector/
government participation in Stereosat. While this study had definite goals
and objectives, and sought to answer the questions presented, the large degree
of uncertainty surrounding this venture by government has resulted in the
focus here being one of issues definition. No attempt has been made to under-
take a complete analysis. The intent has been to examine some identified
issues. Considerable research remains to be done to fully understand both the
market for stereo imagery, and the advantages and disadvantages of those
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institutional structures identified and others which may be proposed in the
future.
This document reports studies undertaken at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
UPL) in support of the NASA Earth Resources Observation Program. Within JPL
the study represents an application to space related activities of skills
which were developed to support primarily energy research programs. Within
NASA the document ie intended to make program managers aware of the types of
nontechnical issues which would have to be addressed to implement Stereosat.
The document is intended to be read by government policy makers, specifically
within NASA, to assist them in interfacing with the private sector.
The report structure parallels the two questions discussed above. The
first section examines the question of the 'value" of Stereosat data to the
private sector and the government. Since no accurate market data were
available, the question of value is examined from the perspective of the user
community and the perspective of the federal government. For Stereosat to be
a viable mission, it must have "value", even if that "value" is only a
subjective perception of positive net benefit.
The next section of the report is basedd on the following: assume that
Stereosat will be implemented, what joint private sector/government
instiLutional structures could be appropriate. Since one institutional
structure could encompass the entire system, or different institutional
structures could be appropriate for components of the total system, the
Stereosat subsystems which may be independently organized are then discussed.
Generic institutional structures and the influence of the market for stereo
images on those structures are examined. Two case studies of specific
concepts to implement Stereosat are discussed.
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The third major section of the report discusses legal and institutional
issues which may constrain the choice of institutional structure. Fourth,
some existing institutional models are examined. Ine final section is an




At any point in time there are many more projects which could be
undertaken to the overall betterment of society than resources will allow.
The problem is to choose those projects which are by some criteria "more
valuable", "better" or a "higher priority." The selection of the criteria,
which themselves change in response to changing social needs, determines the
projects more likely to be undertaken than not. In the private sector,
capital is generally allocated to projects having the greatest expected
potential return on investment for a given risk, an economic efficiency
criterion. The projects undertaken by government are generally those
considered to advance the mission of the particular agency and the government
as a whole. The budget process generally results in only the highest priority
?rojects of each agency being funded. The government selection criteria are,
thus, political ones based on public policy. It should be noted, however,
that the government often also applies economic efficiency criteria in the
budget process to select projects.
It should also be noted that value is different from cost. The cost of
Stereosat is a function of the technology employed to provide the imagery.
Value is the benefit derived from having the imagery available for use. Value
is an elusive concept; it means different things to different people. An
investor in Stereosat would like to know how user perceptions of value would
be translated into willingness to pay for imagery. This information, however,
is not available. Value and willingness to pay can, therefore, only be
assessed qualitatively. One way to determine the value of Stereosat is to
examine the perspectives of persons and organizations who might participate in
the implementation or be affected by it.
A. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE USER COMMUNITY
The United States has for alnost a decade been observing the earth's land
surface from space with the Land sat series of satellites.
"The three most important potential uses of the Landsat data
identified so far correspond to three of the major problems
confronting the world tc"2y, These are energy supplies, food
production, and global large-scale environmental monitoring ...
Landsat imagery also has proven to be a valuable tool when used
in conjunction with other data sources for ... preparing base and
geologic maps.112
Stereosat, as an adjunct to existing Landsat imagery, appears to have its
greatest value in the search for oil and minerals, and in cartography.
1.	 Exploration Geology
In May 1976, a workshop was held in Flagstaff, Arizona, by predominantly
industry geologists to answer the question, "What do the geology related
industries want specifically from remote sensing?" 3
 The highest priority
recommendation was:
"1. Worldwide stereoscopic coverage missions (Stereosat) ... for
geological and structural interpretation and mapping. 114
"Landsat-C," NASA Office of Public Affairs, Goddard Space Flight
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, at 2 (March 1978).
3
	
	 Frederick B. Henderson and Gordon A. Swann (eds.), Geola ical Remote
Sensing From Space, Report of the Ad Hoc Geological Committee on
Remote Sensing From Space with Recommendations for a Geosat Program,
at vi (May 10-14, 1976), hereinafter referred to rs the "Flagstaff
Report."
4	
Flagstaff Report, at 1-1.
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This recommendation was based on an identification of geological parameters
for oil, gas, and mineral exploration which are not available from Landsat
imagery. The most forceful argument for having stereoscopic imaging was
presented by the oil and gas exploration workshop.
"A major deficiency in the present Landeat system is the lack
of worldwide stereo coverage, because basic photogeologic mapping
techniques depend on three dimensional perspective that stereoscopic
images provide. Stereo perception is essential because most of the
geological phenomena sought after are three-dimensional features
that are incompletely and poorly displayed on the two-dimensional
format of a single image ...
When studied in stereo vision, the nature of many lineaments
can be segregated into groups of faults, joints, indeterminate
linear features. This is particularly significant if geological
space remote sensing is going to be an e ffective tool for global
geologic and tectonic studies."5
The mineral resources and engineering and environmental geology workshops also
articulated a significant need for
"... high resolution (10-meter) photographic and multispectral
scanning sensors with worldwide stereoscopic coverage for geologic
and structural mapping ..."6
2. Carto a Igr 
The cartographic user community has not yet articulated a need for
sterEOSCOpic imagery in an organized fashion similar to the exploration
community. An indication of value may be the Request for Proposal (RFP)
issued by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to investigate the feasibility of
an automated mapping satellite system (Mapsat). ?
 The Mapsat RFP argues that
5	 Flagstaff Report, at 3-7.
6	 Flagstaff Report, at 5-24, for example.
7	 U.S. Geological Survey, Request for Proposal No. 6398, "Feasibility Study
for the Conceptual Design of an Automated Mapping Satellite System,"
October 15, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the "Mapsat RFP."
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Landsat imagery would have greater utility
"by finer spatial resolution, and by providing stereoscopic
coverage from which terrain relief could be determined and
correlated with the multispectral response from Landsat ...
..* most applications require that the data be geographically
located--mapped--with an accuracy approximately equivalent to the
spatial resolution."S
While there appears to be a number of differences between the Stereosat sensor
system a:d that proposed for Mapsat, the Mapsat stereo imaging requirements
could possibly be met by modifications to Stereosat.
Once the question of technological capabilities is resolved, the inquiry
becomes the size of the cartographic user community. Within the United States
the U.S Geological Survey is probably the single largest user of remote sensed
imagery for cartographic purposes. USGS purchased approximately one-third of
the total U.S. government purchases of Landsat imagery over the period
1973-1978, but not all of this imagery was used for cartography. Government
purchases were about one-third of total sales.9
The potential cartographic market worldwide is unknown. The Mapsat RFP
specifies a data product aimed at use worldwide:
it 	 a Mapsat image map published at 1:100,000-scale might well
have accuracy comparable to that of a 1:50,000-scale line map which
is standard throughout the world."10
8	 Mapsat RFP, Section E, Specifications, at 1.
9	 Data provided by the Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Data
Center, Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
10	 Mapsat RFP, Section E, Specifications, at 2.
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3.	 Stereo Satellite Data Product Market Assessment
One of the recommendations of the Flagstaff meeting industry geologists
was the creation of an industry supported Geosat Committee
"to pursue and espouse industry related geologic objectives
within the framework of the ongoing space program."11
The Geosat Committee had its organizational.meeting in the fall of 1976. In
early spring 1977 the Geosat Committee formed a Stereosat Task Force to assess
the potential market for stereo satellite imagery.1 2
 The Stereosat Task
Force was formed to respond to a request by the federal government, members of
Congress and the NASA Office of Applications, to determine "a formula for
equitable industry Luring of the Stereosat program costs." 13
 The Geosat
Committee Stereosat rusk Force Report was published in November 1978.
The Geosat Market Study first described a Stereosat data product designed
to meet the needs of the geological industry. This data product encompassed
five criteria: near term global coverage, stereo imagery, improved
resolution, Landsat compatibility, and a synoptic view.14
The Geosat Committee data product description was the basis of two
surveys of potential users. The first survey included Geosat Committee member
companies, nonmember companies, government agencies, and ten experts in the
11	 Flagstaff Report, at vi.
12	 Letter to Dr. Anthony J. Calio, Associate Administrator for Space and
Terrestrial Applications, NASA from Dr. Frederick B. Henderson,
President, the Geosat Committee, dated May 9, 1978.
13 Frederick B. Henderson, Paul M. Maughan and Frederick L. Hoffman, Stereo
Satellite Data Product Market Assessment, November, 1978, at 1-1,
hereinafter referred to as the "Geosat-Market Study."
14	 Geosat Market Study, at 3-1.
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mineral and oil industry familiar with remote sensing technology.1 5
 The
experts were asked to provide opinions about the potential global market.16
The surveyed organizations were sent a letter describing the Stereosat data
product and a questionnaire which asked each of them to estimate his
quantitative prospective purchases over a three-dear period based on an
assumed product price of $450 per stereo pair of images.17
A follow-up survey of some major oil and mineral companies and a few
government agencies attempted to elicit further cosments on the potential
market for Stereosat images. Major Geosat Committee member companies and a
tew government agencies were solicited for Letters of Interest to purchase
StereosaE data products. Fourteen responses were obtained.18
These surveys formed the basis of a quantitative estimate of the
potential market for Stereosat images. The first step in the analysis was to
fix a price for the data product.
"The data product price of $450 was based on the Stereosat Task
Force's preliminary estimate of the value of the data product
relative to Stereoscopic aerial photography and Landsat imagery on a
per square kilometer basis. Figures used by the Task Force ranged
from $5.00 per square mile ($1.93 per square kilometer) for stereo
aerial photography to $0.02 per square mile ($0.01 per square
kilometer) for an average Landsat image data product. The $0.12 per
square kilometer was a compromise by the Task Force members."19
Based on quantitative information trom 39 Geosat Committee industry
members, and based on Landsat sales history, the market study estimated a
15 Geosat Market Study, at 3-1.
16 Geosat Market Study, at 4-1.
17 Geosat Market Study, at 4-1; Appendix C.
18 Geosat Market Study, at 4-4.
19 Geosat Market Study, at 6-1.
f
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United States industrial demand of approximately 139.5 million square
kilometers of coverage over the three-year life of Stereosat, and a
corresponding global market, including the United States, of about 474.4
million square kilometers. The United States industrial demand would,
therefore, be about 39,000 data products and worldwide demand 132,000 data
products.20
At the time the market study was undertaken, Stereosat was expected to
cost about $100 million with additional operating and maintenance expenses of
about $10 million over the three-year life of the satellite. Spreading these
costs over the global demand resulted in a product r ice of $835 per stereo
pair.21
"Based on the $450 assumed value, the •i '	 18S per product
cost differential that must be supplied ei.her t 1
 ,,; —;;h government
support or increased prices.1122
The global market comprised of industry, state, local and federal government,
individuals, and foreign entities was estimated to be about $59 million. The
United States industrial sector was to account for about $17 million of this
total market.23
The polic y
 conclusion reached by the Geosat market study was that
"... the amount needed to underwrite the Stereosat mission
approximates a 1/2 user ratio, 1/2 government (where the user
support derives from product sales and government funds are
appropriated program funds.)"24
20 Geosat Market Study, Table 5.2, at 5-5.
21 Geosat Market Study, at 6-2.
22 Ibid.
23 Geosat Market Study, at 6-1.
24 Geosat Market Study, at 1-2.
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Professor Leonard J. Parsons of the College of Industrial Management,
Georgia Institute of Technology, reviewed the Geosat Market Study and
concluded:
"The Geosat Report was a useful preliminary market assessment
for Stereosat. However, the estimated global requirements for
stereo data products may nod even be a good ballpark figure."25
Some of the factors  which led Professor Parsons to his conclusion include:
(1) The disproportionate importance of a relatively few potential users of
the Stereosat data, that is, a relatively few users are expected to
account for a large proportion of sales.
(2) The reliability of survey estimates of market demand. In this case, it
is questionable whether the user knows or is willing to reveal his demand
for Stereosat images, and if an estimate was given, whether that
estimated demand will be true demand when the images are available.
(3) The assumed relationship between Landsat and Stereosat users.
(4) The assumed relationship between the historic Landsat sales history and
projected Stereosat sales; and the assumed relationship between Geosat
industrial companies and the projected world market based on that sales
nistory. The worldwide market is estimated to be a multiple of the
Geosat Committee member industrial companies.
(5) The expected sales profile of Stereosat should cumulative l y be S-shaped,
that is, slow sales initially while the product is being evaluated, a
rapid sales growth once usefulness is dez!3nstrated, and a slowing of
sales as users have purchased a complete set of Stereosat images. Since
Landsat provides repetitive coverage, some users continue to purchase its
images.
25	 Sea, Appendix 1.
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(6) The lack of analysis of the sensitivity of demand to price.
Professor Parsons' evaluation is presented in Appendix 1.
4. Summary
The oil and mineral exploration industry and the cartographic community
have articulated a need for stereoscopic imagery in their particular
application. This "need" seems to be at the level of "it would help and it
would be nice to have." In areas where stereo imagery is essential, it is
currently obtained via aircraft overflight. In many parts of the world it is
difficult or impossible to get permission to overfly. Stereosat would provide
worldwide coverage not readily obtainable via another mode.
The fundamental question is if these user communities "need" Stereosat
data, how much are they willing to pay to obtain it. Put another way, if the
images are as valuable as these users claim, are they willing to contribute
capital upfront sufficient to procure, launch, and operate Stereosat? It
appears they are not.
It should be noted that the COMSAT General Corporation undertook a market
study to determine the viability of investing in Stereosat. This market study
was proprietary to the company.26
B. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
1.	 National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The idea for Stereosat was presented to NASA in July 1976. 27 Prel i m-
26	 Personal communication, Dr. Paul M. Maughan, Director, Earth Sensing
Systems, COMSAT General Corporation, November 1979.
27	 Preliminary Mission Description, at 1-2.
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inary studies were undertaken in late 1976 and early 1977 in anticipation of a
New Project Start28 in Fiscal Year 1979 (FY'79). NASA did not go forward in
its FY'79 budget proposal with Stereosat as a New Project Start.
During the FY'79 budget hearings in Congress, members of the user
community testified in support of Stereosat. The result was a supplemental
appropriation of $500 9 000 in FY 1 79 to support a mission study. In making
these study monies available, members of the House and Senate Subcommittees on
Space urged that the Geosat Committee investigate the feasibility of user
participation in the development and funding of Stereosat.29,30
In early 1578 a mission study was commenced with the objective of a New
Project Start in FY'80. (NASA did not include Stereosat in its FY'80 budget
proposal.) The mission study continued through FY'79. The studies in FY'79
included an examination of potential roles for private sector participation in
Stereosat; this report documents the results.
Within NASA there is still considerable interest in Stereosat. In the
current times of tight budgets, the inability to articulate a clear, private
sector involvement in Stereosat, specifically private investment, was probably
28 A 'New Project Start' means the project will from that point be a live
item in the Federal Budget. It is authority for major system procure-
ments. The project can still be terminated or altered, but the
designation 'New Project Start' usually means that NASA intends to see
the project through to completion.
29	 Operational Remote Sensing Legislation: Hearings on S.663 and S.875
before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate
Committee on'Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Congress, First
Session at 202 (April 9 and 11, 1979) (statement of Frederick B. Hender-
son III, President of the Geosat Committee), hereinafter referred to as
S.663/875, April 1979.'
30	 This was the impetus for the Geosat Market Study.
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a major factor in NASA not going forward for a New Project Start. Other
influences, to be discussed below, were also important.
In summary, the mission objectives of Stereosat remain of interest within
NASA. Because Stereosat has capabilities which are perceived by some as being
commercially viable, NASA was placed in an awkward position. NASA was, in
effect, considering a mission going well beyond its research and development
charter. Since at that time basic policy determination on an operational land
remote sensing system had not been made, NASA was the logical agency to handle
Stereosat. With the designation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) as the agency responsible for operational land remote
sensing systems31 , future decisions about Stereosat in its present
configuration will be made in the context of its role as an adjunct to the
evolving operational remote sensing system.
2.	 Interagency Task Force on Private Sector Involvement in Civil Space
Remote Sensing
In Presidential Directive/NSC-42, entitled Civil and Further National
Space Policy, issued October 10, 1978, the President directed NASA and NOAA to
investigate potential private sector roles in the operation of civil remote
sensing systems.32
"5. Private Sector Involvement. Under the joint chairmanship of
Commerce and NASA, along with other appropriate agencies, a plan of
action will be prepared by February 1, 1979, on how to encourage
private investment and direct participation in the establishment and
operations of civil remote sensing systems. NASA and Commerce
jointly will be the contacts for the private sector on this matter
31	 p residential Directive/NSC-54 1
 Civil Operational Remote Sensing,
November 16, 1979, hereinafter referred to as 'PD-54.'
32 Presidential Directive/NSC-42, Civil and Further National Space
Policy, October 10, 1978, hereinafter referred to as 'PD-42.'
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and will analyze proposals received before submitting to the Policy
Review Committee (Space) for consideration and action.(U)"33
The focus of the Private Sector Involvement Study (PSIS) was "the potential
role of the private sector in the ownership and operation of space remote
sensing systems as a commercial enterprise." 34
 PSIS specifically considered
Stereosat and concluded
"For the Stereosat system, the government support required would be
$40M/year. There has been little interest displayed by government
agencies in obtaining operational data from a new Stereosat system.
Therefore, most of the government support would be as a subsidy."35
Stereosat was thus viewed as not commercially viable without significant
government participation. The private market estimate used to reach this
conclusion was that provided by the Geosat Market Study.
The general conclusion reached in the PSIS for the Landsat system is, by
implication, appropriate for Stereosat.
"...it is too early to select specific options for conversion of the
space and ground segments of the Landsat system to private
ownership. This is not to say that it is too early for private
participation bL.t that it is too early to constrain the alternatives
that might be put forward by the private sector.
It appears that the private sector is only now beginning to
develop concrete proposals for major investment in systems, that
thinking among different firms with regard to such proposals differs
very substantially, that the shape of future systems is not
sufficiently defined, that current government studies of the
possible integration of systems will need extended consideration,
that the technical and market potential of even Landsat D/D' is yet
to be learned--that for all these and additional reasons it would be
best to avoid selection of a single option at this time.
33	 PD-42. Note: The due date was later changed to June 15, 1979 to
integrate Lae Private Sector Involvement Study (PSIS) with a related
Integrated Remote Sensing Systems Study (IRS3).
34	 Interagency Task Force on Private Sector Involvement in Civil Space
Remote Sensing, Private Sector Involvement in Civil Space Remote
Sensing 2 (June 15,	 , hereinafter re erred to as 'PSIS'.
35	 PSIS, at 16.
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Instead, some time should be allowed to permit the private
sector to further develop its thinking and offer a variety of
approaches which may be evaluated in terms of the public interest.
If the government were to select a single option at this time, it is
likely that only one or two proposals, if 	 could be expected
from the private sector for implementing that particular option.
Other equally or more advantageous proposals, current or potential,
would be excluded, even though there would be other interested
firms, because their interest would be associated with different
options.
In order to stimulate the development and submission of all
proposals which might be in the public interest, it would appear
appropriate to request proposals addressed to general criteria
rather than to a selected system configuration or particular
institutional approach.1136
Some criteria for judging private sector proposals were articulated in
the PSIS.
"In general, proposals for private sector initiatives should be
judged on their relative merit in meeting objectives such as the
following:
1. The extent to which they are generally favorable to the
government and the economy, i.e., the extent to which they reduce
the burden of government costs for the service.
2. The extent to which they reliably meet government and private
sector needs.
3. The extent to which they are cost effective in meeting
public/private needs.
4. The prospects for developing commercial markets for data and
services.
5. The feasibility and extent of government support and
involvement required.
6. The assurance that continuity of service to meet government
requirements would be guaranteed.
7. Their amenability to the necessary government presence in and
regulation of the system.
8. Compatibility with evolving domestic policy on remote sensing
(including the many decisions which may follow from the study of
integrated remote sensing systems).
9. Their compatibility with evolving international policies and
commitment.
10. The extent to which they would accelerate private investment
and participation (including the advantageous use of existing or
planned government facilities.)
36	 PSIS, at 28.
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11. The extent to which they preserve or advance U.S. leadership in
space remote sensing.1137
In summary, the PSIS concluded that it may be too early to determine an
appropriate joint private sector/government institutional structure for either
Stereosat or the current Landsat system. PSIS did conclude that there are
significant opportunities for private sector involvement in the future and
recommended a plan of government action to enhance those opportunities.
3. Evolving an Operational Remote Sensing System
As the benefits of satellite remote sensing have been demonstrated using
the Landsat system, a user community throughout the world has developed. The
growth and development of this nascent industry is dependent to a great extent
on the continued availability of a steady flow of satellite remotely sensed
data. "Many potential users refrain from making necessary investments for the
use of remotely sensed data because they fear the experimental system will be
abandoned by the government." 38 This concern has led to a desire for a
commitment on the part of the federal government to an operational remote
sensing system.
Early legislative approaches to establishing an operational remote
sensing system took the form of Senate Bill 657, Earth Resources and
Environmental Information System, introduced in the 95th Congress, First
Session; Senate Bill 3589, Earth Data and Information Service Act of 1978, and
Senate Bill 3625, Earth Resources Information Satellite Act of 1979, both
37	 PSIS, at 29.
38	 Arlen J. Large, "NASA Finds Many Buyers for Satellite Pictures and Plans
New, More Revealing Landsats in 1980'x," Wall Street Journal, April 5,
1979, at 1.
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introduced in the 95th Congress, Second Session. Hearings were held on 5.657
only.
"At that time administration witnesses opposed passage because, in
their view, the legislation was premature. Dr. Frank Press,
Director, Office of Science and Technology, Office of the President
testified that a Cabinet-levelgroup was assembled to consider the
issue and make recommendations ."39,40
In June 1978 9 the President issued Presidential Directive/NSC-379
entitled "National Space Policy,"41 wherein he stated the space principles
"The United States will develop and operate on a global basis active
and passive remote sensing operations in support of national
objectives."42
PD-37 also created a National Security Coancil (NSC) Policy Review Committee
(PRO to formulate a civil space policy within the following guidelines:
"The United States will encourage domestic commercial
exploitation of space capabilities and systems for economic benefit
and to promote the technological position of the United States;
however, all United States earth-oriented remote sensing satellites
will require United States government authorization and supervision
or regulation.
Advances in earth imaging from space will be permitted under
controls and when such needs are ,justified and assessed in relation
to civil benefits, national security, and foreign policy. Controls,
as appropriate, on other forms of remote earth sensing will be
established.
Data and results from the civil space programs will be provided
the widest practical dissemination to improve the condition of human
beings on earth and to provide improved space services for the
United States and other nations of the world.1143
39	 9.663/875, April 1979, at 1 (Opening Statement of Senator Adlai E.
Stevenson).
40	 The 'Cabinet-level gaoup' is the NSC Policy Review Committee (Space).
41	 Presidential Directive/NSC-37, National Space Policy, June 20 9 19789
hereinafter referred to as 'PD-37'.
42	 White House Press Release (Description of a Presidential Directive
on National Space Policy), June 20, 1978.
43	 Ibid.
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The studies undertaken by PRC (Space) led the President to announce a
U.S. Civil Space Policy in October 1978. 44
 At this time the President
committed the United States to "continuity of data" from the Landsat system.
"Remote sensing systems .--Since 1972 the United States has conducted
experimental civil remote sensing through Landsat satellites. There
are many successful applications and users, including Federal
departmenta l other nations, a number of States, and a growing number
of commercial organizations. The United States will continue to
provide data from the developmental Landsat program for all classes
of users. Operational uses of data from the experimental system
will continue to be made by public, private, and international
users. Specific details and configurations of the Landsat system
and its management and organizational factors will evolve over the
next several years to arrive at the appropriate technology mix, test
organizational arrangements, and develop the potential to involve
the private sector.1145
The President also made a firm commitment to involve the private sector
in civil remote sensing systems.
"The private sector .--Along with other appropriate agencies, NASA
and Commerce will prepare a plan of action on how to encourage
private investment and direct participation in civil remote sensing
systems. NASA and Commerce will be the contacts for the private
sector on this matter and will analyze proposals received befc:e
submitting to the Policy Review Committee (Space) for consideration
and action."46
Although these two policy decisions had been made, evolving an institutional
structure to implement them was yet to be undertaken.
Two bills introduced in the Senate subsequent to PD-42 attempted to
legislatively create institutional structures for an operational remote
sensing system to provide this continuity. Senate Bill 663, the Earth Data
and Information Service Act of 1979, 96th Congress, First Session, would have
created an Earth Data and Information Service as an agency of the federal
44	 PD-42.
45	 Fact Sheet, U.S. Civil Space Policy, the White House, October 11, 1978.
46	 Ibid.
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government within NASA. This bill was basically a "holding action" to provide
for the acquisition and dissemination of Earth resources data by the federal
government until appropriate institutional mechanisms were investigated so the
government could reach a decision as to whether and how this activity should
ce transferred to the private sector. The service was given a maximum term of
seven years.
Senate Bill 875, the Earth Resources Information Corporation Act of 1979,
96th Congress, First Session, would create a "for profit" private corporation
to establish and operate a commercial Earth Resources information service.
The federal government would act as the incorporator and retain 20-percent
ownership of the shares. In other respects, the Corporation resembles the
traditional ;t ivate corporation. Both of these bills are discussed in detail
in Appendix 2.
Hearings were held on both bills by the Subcommittee on Science,
Technology and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation on April 9 and 11, 1979 and again on July 31, 1979.
Administration witnesses at those hearings again reiterated their view that
legislation was premature.
"My own view, having looked at the bill, is that it asks for a
commitment to a very specific form of management and operational
status which we believe is premature in the light of all the ferment
that's going on--the ferment in the form of a new private sector
interest for commercialization of remote sensing; the renewed and
expanded interest by domestic agencies putting up their own
budgetary funds for remote-sensing applications; the expanded
foreign interest in remote sensing; the review by NASA and the
Department of Commerce, which is now in a mature stage, for finding
means to encourage private sector involvement —for all of these
reasons, especially because the technology is still evolving, we
feel that to make a commitment at this time to a very specific form
of management would be premature.1147
47	 5.663/875, April 1979, at 49 (Statement of Dr. Frank Press,
Director, Office of Science and Technology, Office of the President).
I
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The administration witness stated that, "the administration is committed to an
operational remote sensing system,"48 as evidence) by PD-42, but that more
study was required to create an appropriate institutional structure which
would involve the private sector.
These bills are still pending before the Senate Subcommittee on Science,
Technology and Space.
In the period after announcement of PD-42 9 October 1978, the
Administration continued to study options for assuring the "continuity of
data" from Landeat. On November 15, 1979, the President issued Presidential
Directive/NSC-54, entitled "Civil Operational Remote Sensing," assigning
management responsibility for civil operational land remote sensing activities
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA was
directed to prepare a transition plan by June 1, 1980 9 and to seek ways to
further involve the private sector in civil land remote sensing.
"Commerce's initial responsibility--in coordination with other
appropriate agencies--will be to develop a time-phased transition
plan covering: (1) a Program Board (discussed below); (2)
organization for management and regulation; (3) system financing
including pricing policies for the users sharing of costs; (4)
technical programs; (5) establishment of private and international
participation; (6) identification of facilities (including the EROS
data center), hardware, and personnel that should be transferred;
and (7) identification of actions such as executive orders and
legislation required.
b.	 Private Sector Involvement. Our goal is the eventual operation
by the private sector of our civil land remote sensing activities.
Commerce will budget for further work in FY 1981 to seek ways to
enhance private sector opportunities (e.g., joint venture with
industry, a quasi-government corporation, leasing, etc.). Commerce
will be the contact for private industry on this matter and with the
Program Board will analyze any proposals received prior to






The events synopsized above reflect a movement towards implementation of
an operational remote sensing system. Stereosat would enhance the data
already being obtained or that which will be received once the operational
system is implemented. It is reasonable to infer, however, that Stereosat is
viewed as a complement to the operational system and not an integral
component. Given the appropriate emphasis on implementing the operational
system which serves a larger user community than Stereosat, Stereosat is not
as high a priority within the government as the operational system. This is
not to say, however, that Stereosat has no value. Rather, it is to defer a
decision on a government commitment to Stereosat until it can be evaluated in
the context of an operational remote sensing system.
C. S UMARY
It is clear that both government and the private sector feel the data
which would be obtained by Stereosat has value. Both the private sector and
the government agree that Stereosat has private value; that is, the
information obtained by using Stereosat imagery would benefit a number of
applications iia the private sector. Government appears to want the private
sector to recognize the private value of Stereosat and contribute to its
implementation accordingly. The private sector acknowledges that Stereosat
has private value, but appears unable at present to accommodate_ the market
uncerta;.nty associated with the perceived value.
The Government has acknowledged that value would accrue to society
through increased private sector participation in civil remote sensing
programs, including Stereosat. Social value would also accrue through use of
Stereosat imagery in government applications. The social value which would
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accrue to the United States from Stereosat as a researur, and development
activity has not been articulated by either the private sector or government.
A number of components of the value of Stereosat have been identified.
None by itself seems sufficient to justify proceeding to implement Stereosat.
Taken together, the various statements make the value of Stereosat seem
apparent. There is, however, no unity of force sufficient to lead to
implementation. The perceived value remains ethereal.
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SECTION III
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOP. JOINT PRIVATE SECTOR/
GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN STEREOSAT
A. INTRODUCTION
In examining both the private sector and the federal government, it is
readily apparent that a large and diverse number of organizational models are
available, given the goals and objectives to be achieved by the institutional
structure which was created. For example, within the government there exists
the Airport and Airways Development Fund which is dosignated monies collected
primarily from fuel taxes and user charges on the aviation community. Under
the enabling legislation, these funds must be returned to the aviation sector
by being spent on improvements to air transportation facilities. Thia is an
example of a public trust fund.
An organization which involves both the government and the private sector
is the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). COMSAT was created by
Congress as a private corporation with the U.S. monopoly in the global
commercial communications system, INTELSAT 50 . Once COMSAT was created it
was soon permitted to expand into the domestic and maritime communications
satellite business. COMSAT was at the time of its creation a "chosen
instrument", that is, an entity specifically created to achieve a particular
goal. Today COMSAT is a private sector corporation competing for business
activities to provide a return to its investor stockholders. It still enjoys
50	 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. 701 et. seq., Pub, L. No.
87-624, 76 Scat. 419 (1962).
a
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a monopoly in the international communications arena, but must compete
competitively in the domestic communications and maritime satellite business
and other ventures. Through a recent acquisition it hopes to use satellite
communications systems in environmental monitoring.
A traditional electric utility is an example of a regulated monopoly.
The utility raises capital funds which it invests in electricity production
and di,- .rsbution facilities. It charges for electricity and makes a rate of
return. on tai=-^ capital investment. It would be very inefficient to have
multiple electrical services in any given area, thus a monopoly is a
reasonable form of organization, that is, electrical distribution is a natural
monopoly. Utilities are normally regulated by a state Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) which sets an allowable return on investment. Rate-of-return
monopoly regulation has the undesirable characteristic of creating incentives
nor the regulated firm to incur higher costs than necessary in the short run,
and over the long run to retard the introduction of cost saving technology,
thereby maintaining higher costs. Since rate-of-return regulation limits
profits to a fixed percentage of invested capital, the regulated firm can
increase profits only by increasing its capital, the rate base.
The domestic communications satellite business is an example of regulated
competitive entities. In the domestic communications business there are a
number of private sector organizations which build satellites and provide
communication services to the private sector and the federal government. They
compete for customers and provide the service at a cost less than or equal to
that of their competitors. Participants in domestic communication satellites
are classified as common carriers and are subject to regulation by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). These organizations must obtain a license
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from the FCC to provide the service, and must also obtain approval for the
prices, that is the cost of service, to be charged to the users.
Each of the above institutional structures is an example of an actual
organizational entity wherein there are varying degrees of private sector and
government involvement. There are, in fact, many other ways in which the
private sector and the government jointly participate in activities. For
example, where an activity has the indication of an adequate return on
investment, but the technology is relatively uncertain, the government may
guarantee loans provided by private sector financial institutions to the
entity undertaking the risky activity. An example of this is the geothermal
loan guarantee program, wherein the government guarantees loans provided by
private financial institutions to builders of geothermal power plants.
This brief survey demonstrates that the government has in the past
responded to the needs of its programs by creating a variety of institutional
structures which include private sector participation. The question here is
the joint private sector/government institutional structures most appropriate
for Stereosat. Before the question can be answered, an analytic methodology
must be discussed and the goals, objectives and characteristics of the
Stereosat mission must be analyzed.
B. THE IMPACT OF THE STEREOSAT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION ON INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
Before examining the overall Stereosat system, a brief discussion of some
aspects of the theory of monopolies is appropriate. Monopoly power within an
industry is generally defined as the power to control price or to exclude
competition. 51 A monopolist is a seller who can change the market price for
51	 L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust, Section 9 (1977).
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his product by changing the amount he sells.52
Certain kinds of goods and services have been subjected to government
regulation because they share common economic traits. These are the "natural
monopolies," examples of which include electric power transmission and
distribution, natural gas distribution, and communications. The essence of
the natural monopoly is that it would be illogical to have multiple competing
producers for a product or service where the economies of scale and cost
effectiveness are most appropriately captured by a single firm. For example,
it is much more efficient to hRve a single telephone company serving a city
than to have more than one. To have more than one telephone service would
require duplicate facilities and higher costs to consumers.
The thrust of public policy towards enterprises acting as producers and
sellers has been to enhance competition and prevent monopoly. Implementation
of this policy for natural monopolies would theoretically be to restrict the
monopoly to that arena of productive activity which has the appropriate
economic characteristics, discussed above. In actuality, however, monopoly
has been allowed to a greater extent than is necessary. For example, electric
utility companies have enjoyed monopolies of both production and distribution
of electricity. Only the distribution network is a true natural monopoly.
There is no reason to restrict competition in the production of electricity.
Any g-oup of investors should be able to build a power plant and sell its
electricity to that electricity distributor willing to offer the best price.
Allowing and forcing the distributor, the natural monopolist, to purchase
52	 R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 8 (1976).
-38-
power at the market price yields the greatest welfare to the ultimate
consumers.53
A traditional regulated monopolist, like a utility, has an incentive to
expand into related areas to increase his earnings. Since his return on
investment is a regulated percentage of his invested capital, the only way he
has to increase his return is to have a larger rate base. To get the larger
rate base, the monopolist uses his cash flow to cross subsidize his
expansion. S4
 It is clear, theoretically, that to prevent this happening,
public policy should allow a monopoly only in that portion of the productive
activity which is a natural monopoly.
To analyze potential institutional structures for implementing Stereosat,
it is appropriate to conceptualize the system as having three components% the
spacecraft, including all required prelaunch, launch and station acquisition
activities; the downlink, that is, the ground receiving station for the raw
data; and data processors, one or multiple. See Figure 1. Various
institutional structures may be appropriate for implementing a particular
subsystem.
Spacecraft
The objective of the Stereosat mission was to collect a worldwide data
set of stereo images. The data was to be collected to specification by a
single spacecraft over a three-year period. As discussed above, the market
for images appears insufficient to support even a single commercial enterprise
53 This example was provided by Professor William F. Baxter, Stanford Law
School.
54 This is known in the economic literature as the Averch-Johnson effect.
H. Averch and L. L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulation," 52










































for the entire system. Thus, the spacecraft system has many of the attributer
of a natural monopoly. The government could provide this portion of the
overall system, or could invite private sector participation. In inviting
private sector participation in the spacecraft system, the exclusive
franchise, that is, the monopoly, should theoretically be restricted to that
portion of the system which is a natural monopoly. In this case for the
reasons discussed above, the private sector participant in the spacecraft
system should theoretically be barred from participating in other portions of
the system. There may be noneconomic reasons for not creating this bar. For
example, to induce private sector participation, it may be desirable to allow
one firm to own and operate the entire system.
Downlink
If the market for thf images were sufficient to support multiple
processors, there would be no reason for the government to participate in the
downlink. Once the spacecraft is on station, whether launched by the
government or some joint private sector/government enterprise, any private
sector entity wishing to enter the market for stereo images, for their own use
or to sell to others, could receive data from the spacecraft. The spacecraft
operator would charge a fee for the data.
It is not clear whether the market for images would be sufficient to
allow an acceptable return on an investment just in the downlink and the
processing facility. It may be reasonable for the natural monopoly of the
spacecraft system to encompass the downlink as well. The issues discussed
above would then be applicable.
Data Processor
The market for stereo imagers might have been sufficient to support at
least a single data processor on an all commercial basis. The required
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investment, given that the spacecraft and the downlink existed in some form,
would be considerably less. Therefore, the revenues required to garner an
acceptable return would have been less, and the market may have been able to
provide them. If the market was larger, multiple processors may be
supported. Thus, the data processing might have been a competitive activity
not requiring government participation.
In the event the market was inadequate to support a commercial venture
and government participation was required, the data processing does not have
many characteristics of a natural monopoly. The government might have
participated in a number of institutional structures, but it need not
necessarily have created a monopoly. It should be noted that a transient
monopoly could have been created until t:e market was sufficiently developed
to support a commercial venture.
Since the data processing does not have characteristics of a natural
monopoly, the participants in this activity could be different from the entity
who enjoys the spacecraft or spacecraft and downlink natural monopoly. It is
reasonable to expect that the data processing activity would attract private
sector participants from the established information systems industry and the
geosciences industry.
Summary
The above discussion identified some basic public policy objectives which
could have influenced we implementation of Stereosat. These public policy
objectives were two: all ,)wing a monopoly to exist only to the extent that it
is a natural monopoly, and probihiting the monopolist from participating in
the competitive, that is non-natural monopoly, areas. A number of
institutional structures would allow joint private sector/government
participation and meet these public policy objectives. The final choice of
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institutional structure would have reflected a number of public policy
objectives, including those discussed here. The spectrum of potential
institutional structures is discussed below.
C. TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
Given the public policy objectives discussed above, the fundamental
question becomes what type of institutional structure was appropriate to
achieve the goal of implementing Stereosat. At the one extreme is the
traditional government funded research and development model of a space
venture. The government would provide all of the funding for the project,
would procure the necessary technical expertise, would undoubtedly purchase
components like the boosters and the spacecraft from the private sector, do
the preliminary processing on the data once received on the earth, and
disseminate that data to the private sector. This is the traditional
government mode of doing business in space. The private sector would be an
ultimate user of the data, purchasing it for the cost of reproduction
analogous to the Landsat experience. The current government policy of
fostering private sector participation in space ventures may have precluded
implementation of Stereosat as an all government venture.
At the other extreme is a total private sector venture which would have
been the first of its kind in space. Under this scenario, one or more private
sector entities would invest sufficient capital to procure the spacecraft, the
launch, and carry out the implementation of the mission. This entity or
entities would build the ground data processing facility and sell the data to
users. The private sector entity would of course be constrained by the public
policy issues discussed above, but for the purposes of the discussion of the
type of institutional structures which may be created, the concern here is
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primarily implementation rather than other types of binding constraints to be
discussed below. In the all private sector scenario the price to the user
must be sufficient to guarantee an adequate return on the investment in the
entire system.
Between these two extremes exist many types of institutional structures
which would involve varying degrees of joint private sector/government
participation. For this analysis it is convenient to view the various types
of organizations as existing on a continuum ranging from all government
activities on the one hand, to all private sector activities on the other,
with the hybrid types of organizations in between. See Figure 2. It should
be noted that the types of organizations hereinafter discussed are merely
examples and not an exhaustive set of options. Specific organizations are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Private Sector Ownership of Subsystems
To encourage private sector ownership of subsystems of Stereosat, the
government could have announced its intention to proceed with implementation
and ask private sector entities to make proposals for investing in various
subsystems. The private sector entities would have had to make an assessment
of the potential return on investment from participating in a subsystem
vis-a-vis other investments of its capital. The government would have had to
evaluate each proposal and select the one or several which met its goals and
objectives.
This institutional structure has been shown near the all government
option because the government would have had to implement portions of
Stereosat. The smaller the required private investment, the easier the





















































































One of the factors influencing potential users' decisions to commit to up
front investment was uncertainty about the usefulness of the Stereosat
product, the stereo images, in their own analytic methodology. This user
uncertainty generated market uncertainty. The government could have used a
trust fund to subsidize the learning curve on the use of the data and,
consequently, market development. Here the government would have budgeted for
and proceeded with Stereosat as an all government activity. The monies would
have been appropriated into a trust. One or more private sector entities
would have been invited to implement Stereosat using the trust fund monies.
For the implementation of Stereosat, these organizations would have earned a
fee as a government contractor. Stereosat, in its entirety or subsystems,
would have become a private sector activity when the cost of the purchased
segment was paid into the trust fund, a buy-out.
This institutional structure would have encouraged the private sector to
develop a market for the images and transfer all of Stereosat to private
ownership. The government would have subsidized the private sector's
education about the value of the stereo images. Here the private sector would
have implemented Stereosat as a traditional investment activity but initially
using government money. The system operators would have been encouraged to
develop the system in a way to make it attractive for future private sector
investment. The government, however, must have operated in a "worst case"
fashion in that it must have budgeted Stereosat as an all government activity




When the United States became a participant in the global communications
system, INTELSAT, Congress created the Communications Satellite Corporation,
(COMSAT), to act as the sole U.S. representative. COMSAT was the "chosen
instrument" to implement government policy.
For Stereosat Congress could have created a new organizational entity or
selected an existing one to implement the mission. This organization could
have been a public corporation, a private corporation, a governmental agency,
or any of a number of other types of organizations. Legislative attempts to
do this are discussed above.
The difference between the international communications market and the
market for stereo images is perceived certainty. Revenues to COMSAT were a
certainty; it provided improved services in a known market. Investors could
readily be attracted to purchase the stock of the corporation. The market for
stereo images is an uncertain new market and there is no guarantee that a
private sector entity would survive; government subsidy would still have been
required.
Regulated Monopoly
If the market for stereo images had been sufficient to support a single
private sector entity, the government could have selected that participant,
either by a competitive selection process or as a response to an unsolicited
proposal. The government would have regulated this monopolist similar to the
way utilities are regulated.
Regulated Competitors
Portions of the Stereosat system were similar to the domestic communi-
cations satellite business. The government would have been responsible for
regulating the private sector competitors to ensure that the service provided
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was consistent with government policies, for example, ensuring free access to
the data. Government intrusion into the operation of the market would have
been minimized. For competitors to have existed, however, the market for
stereo images would have to have been significant.
S u°mn. au
There were a number of institutional structures which might have been
appropriate to implement Stereosat. Each institutional arrangement has
attributes which are attractive to the government and the'private sector. The
problem was how to design an appropriate institutional structure for
implementing Stereosat or how to select an existing model. To make this
selection, the government and the private sector must have had an analytic
framework for comparing the attributes of the various proposals. Some of
these issues are discussed below.
D. MARKET SIZE INFLUENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
One of the significant issues was the criteria by which the government
would make a decision on the type of institutional structure to be proposed to
implement Stereosat. A considerable number of issues are yet to be discussed;
however, there is a significant underlying consideration which would have
influenced to a great extent the options which the government might have
pursued.	 Stereosat from a technological perspective was a relatively certain
mission, that is, the technological risk, while not zero, was relatively small
as contrasted with other types of space activities where the technological
risk is significant. As is discussed above, one of the objectives of the
Stereosat mission was to cause the private sector to provide capital funds to
the project up front. It was not clear that this objective could have been
achieved. The willingness of the private sector to invest capital funds is a
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function of their perceived ability to garner a return on their investment.
They also are willing to assume only certain types of risk, those
traditionally associated with new business ventures. The private sector is,
by and large, not willing to undertake large technological or market
uncertainty risk where that market risk is a function of a commercially
undemonstrated technology. Historically snd appropriately, the government is
the organizational entity which undertakes high technology, high risk
activities wherein it is perceived that these activities have social value for
thc: country. An example is nuclear fission and fusion.
The market for stereoscopic imagery was far from certain. To have
created a joint private sector/government institutional structure to implement
Stereosat, the government must have viewed the uncertainty of the
marketability of th product vis-a-vis the ability to have generated
sufficient revenues to pay the cost of the system as having been a major
determinant in the willingness of the private sector to participate. That is,
the private sector investment decision encompasses both the market's ability
to provide revenue, a question of sufficiency, and the probability that the
potential can be achie•red, a question of certainty. The government has
traditionally been more effective ir, formulating policies that reduce
uncertainty than im attempting to develop a market.
Having now organized the various institutional structures which might
have been used to implement Stereosat on a continuum from all government to
all private, it is conceptually appropriate to map a perception of the market
for the stereo images onto that continuum. That is, if the market was viewed
as being very small and there had Feen valid policy reasons far implementing
Stereosat, the government could have undertaken the mission as an appropriate
governmental function and not attempted to recover any cost of the system from
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the private sector, that is, the end user. At the other extreme, if the
market had been relatively certain and the only question was the actual return
on the investmert to be achieved, then it was clear that the private sector
would undoubtedly have undertaken such an activity. This is the classic case
of needing to see a market before making an investment to develop that market
and achieve a return on investment. That is to say, private sector entities
are willing to undertake limited business risk and technological risk.
Technological risk is often reduced through insurance. Combining the
continuum of organizational structures with this perception of the market
yields a continuum of institutional structure options which are influenced by
the ability of the market to provide a return on investment, that is, to pay
part of the cost of the system. As the perception of the market's ability to
repay the cost of the system increased, the type of institutional structure
which could have been undertaken for the Stereosat mission may have changed
over that perceived market. This concept is best explained by a few examples.
If the market was viewed as very speculative but contained within it
sufficient monies to allow for some private sector investment, then it may
have been appropriate for the government to appropriate the total cost of the
system to a trust fund. The private sector would then have been encouraged to
draw upon this trust fund to implement and build the system. The private
sector would, as it sold data, have paid monies into the trust fund. Should
the market in have fact been larger than expected, once the trust fund was
amortized, the activity would have been entirely in the private sector.
As the perception of the market increased it may have been appropriate to
create a private corporation by Congressional enactment, ala COMSAT, to
undertake the Stereosat mission. For this to happen there would, of course,
have to have been a perception that the market was, if not totally able to pay
t
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the cost of the system, at least able to pay a significant part of the system
cost with the government providing the remainder of the revenue.
E. THE INFLUENCE OF STERI:M% ' AS A PUBLIC GOOD ON INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
A public good "differs from a private consumption good in that each man's
consumption of it ... is related to the total ... by a condition of equality
rather than of summation." 55 Information is a classic example of a public
good. The same information can be simultaneously owned by more than one
person without denying either the benefits of ownership. 56 This held true
for Stereosat data.
Public goods typically have the properties of jointness of supply and
nonexcludability. Jointtness of supply means that "once a unit of the service
is made available to one individual, a service unit of the same qualit y
 can be
made available to other individuals at no extra cost." 57 Nonexcludability
means that "once a unit of service is made available to one individual, a
service unit of similar quality not only can but must be made available to all
other individuals." 58 Stereosat had the first of these properties to a
reasonable approximation. Once Stereosat was launched and data collection had
begun, the marginal cost of collecting additional data or making available
additional copies of the images was very small relative to the cost of the
system. The Stereosat operator would not have been able to preclude
55	 P. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure,
37 Review of Economic Studies, at 350 (1955).
56	 M. Porat, Communication in an Information Society, in G. Robinson, Commu-
nications for Tomorrow, Policy Perspectives for the 1980'x, 35 (1979T7.
57	 J. Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare, at 77-8 (1974).
58	 Ibid., at 80.
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reproduction of images without government intervention in the form of creating
a new property right in the information. S9
 This is discussed below.
Stereosat images were concluded to have sufficient properties of classic
public goods to treat them so. If the government had proceeded to implement
Stereosat as a traditional government activity, it could have distr4.buted
Stereosat images in the same way as Landsat images. The government had an
interest in wide dissemination of the data and could Have sold the images for
the cost of reproduction only.
Any private sector/ government institutional structure would have had to
have a mechanism to prevent the appropriability of its product, the Stereosat
images. It was not clear how this protection could have been provided since
information lends itself poorly to classical legal concepts of property
rights. 60
 This difficulty would have been faced by any private sector or
private sector/government entity implementing Stereosat. Although the
measures taken to protect the images may have varied depending on the precise
institutional structure created, the existence of these public good properties
would not have significantly influenced the choice of institutional form.
Further along, as the market was more certain it may have been desirable
to select a monopolist and guarantee him a market, but provide for private
sector investment to implement the system. Even further along, if the market
had been considerably stronger, it may have been desirable to have the
government merely regulate the activity and throw it open to anyone who wanted
to enter the market as competitors subject to regulation. At some point, when
the market was perceived as being sufficient to recover the entire cost of the
59	
See, C. Reich, the New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
60	 N. Porat, at 35.
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system, there would have been no reason for the government to be involved
other than to meet the legal and institutional requirements discussed below.
Thus, perhaps the most significant criteria on the selection of the
appropriate instrument was the perception of the ability of the market for
stereo images to generate sufficient revenue3 to repay the cost of the
Stereosat system.
F. CONSTRAINTS
There are a number of legal and institutional issues which would have
impacted the type of organization created to implement Stereosat. For
analyzing how the government would make a decision on an appropriate
institutional structure to implement Stereosat, it was sufficient to recognize
that these constraints were not insurmountable, that is, they did not
eliminate any organizational options from consideration. In any selected
option there were certain activities which must have been undertaken by the
government to insure the success of creating the type of organization that was
being considered. These issues are more fully discussed below where the
impact of each issue on specific institutional structures is analyzed.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the types of joint private sector/government
institutional structures which might have been created to implement Stereosat
identified a numoer of issues which must be resolved to proceed. The
Stereosat mission was first analyzed to identify those subsystems which had
characteristics of a natural monopoly. It was argued that public policy
should be to restrict monopoly power to those activities which are natural
monopolies. The government might have been able to attract private sector
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participation in all components of Stereosat. Thus, the government could have
had two sets of private sector participants in Stereosat, those providing the
raw data stream and those engaged in marketing products derived from the raw
data stream.
The analysis then moved to the types of institutional structures which
might have been created to implement Stereosat. These institutional
structures were viewed as existing on a continuum from all government activity
to an all private sector one, with joint private sector/government hybrid
organizations in between. The appropriateness of a specific institutional
structure was a function of the market's ability to provide a return on the
private sector investment. Regardless of the specific institutional structure
proposed, the government would have had to ameliorate some economic, legal and
institutional constraints.
The government wished to encourage private sector participation in
Stereosat. The private sector would have participated if it had seen an
investment opportunity with a potential return greater than alternative
investments. The government wanted to commercialize space activities,
especially earth observation activities, as soon as it could reasonably do so.
It is commonly acknowledged that the government has had a very poor
record in demonstrating ability to market products to the private sector. The
private sector has considerable expertise in developing markets. It has been
argued above that the perception of the market was a major consideration in
selecting an institutional structure. Therefore, the government might have
wished to rely on the private sector's demonstrated expertise in assessing
market and allow it to come forward with specific proposals for implementing
Stereosat with private sector participation. That is to say, there does not
appear to have been any need for the government to a priori have selected an
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institutional structure to implement Stereosat. The government could announce
the proposed program and set any appropriate ground rules; for example,
participants providing the raw data stream might not compete in the processing
of the data. The government would then have had to be prepared to evaluate
the proposals advanced. Should no acceptable proposals have been forthcoming,
the government would have had to be prepared to implement Stereosat as an all
government mission.
This "wait and see" approach imposed two requirements on government. It
should have had a consistent analytical framework to compare the proposals
advanced, and it should have understood to some degree the extent of the
market for stereo images. The latter requirement was necessary to formulate
an appropriate government participation, both in form and amount. It was
expected that the private sector proposals would have proposed an
institutional structure and a subsidy form and amount. The government should
have been able to independently evaluate the subsidy request.
H. TWO CASE STUDIES
In the course of the studies undertaken, two concepts to implement
Stereosat were advanced, one by NASA and one by a private corporation. Each
concept is discussed below. NASA had considered a joint private sector/
government institutional structure anich gave the private sector the market
development responsibility and opportunity. The private corporation suggested
it would undertaKe implementation of the entire Stereosat system with
government underwriting of a portion of the required revenues.
1.	 Private Sector Marketing Proposition
Under this model the government would have procured the spacecraft,
launched it, and begun to transmit data to the earth. The government would
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have provided a stream of raw data from Stereosat to the private sector. One
or more private sector entities would have built the facilities to process the
raw data stream provided by the government and converted it into marketable
Stereoscopic products which would then have been sold to end users. Thus, the
interface between the government and the private sector would be at the raw
data stream. See Figure 3. The private sector entity or entities which
undertook this data service activity would have garnered return on investment
by the difference between the product price to the end user or to other value
added processors, and the price it paid the government for the raw data. Even
within this relatively simple concept of a joint private sector/government
arrangement, there were a number of options which could have been considered
in its implementation.
The respective duties of the government and the private sector entity
would have been for the government to guarantee data at the interface, that
is, the raw data stream. The private sector would have agreed to market and
develop the products, and would have guaranteed throughput, that is, that they
would have rapidly converted the raw data into useable products which would
then have been distributed into the private sector.
There were a number of ways in which the government could have proceeded
to implement this concept. The first, and perhaps the most desirable in terms
of having the fewest numbers of operative constraints, would have been for the
government to have announced the data availability at a fixed price in terms
of the raw data. With this announcement of a fixed price then any private
sector entity who wished to operate a data service would have contracted with
the government to procure the raw data, built its own data handling system,
and perhaps developed selective markets. See Figure 4. This option basically
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Another option to have insured that at least one private sector entity
stepped forward to operate this data service would have been for the
government to have issued a request for proposal (RFP) to select a data
service entity. One of the selection criteria for the data service would have
been the amount of investment that the entity was willing to commit to the
venture. This data service would have had to balance the price to be charged
versus its investment and the price it was willing to pay for the raw data to
gurrantee its required return on investment. In other words, the respondents
to the RFP would in their proposal would have had to suggest a raw data price
to the government and specified a market price structure for the end product.
It should be acknowledged that most of these people would have wanted the data
to be provided free. This issue could have been handled by setting a minimum
price. In this model the government would have guaranteed a temporal
exclusive franchise by the selection of at least one data service to initially
receive government support. That support could have been the exclusive right
to sell to the government for some negotiable fixed period. The exclusive
franchisee who received government support would have been able to sell to any
private sector entity, that is, develop the private sector market. See Figure
5. At some later time as other private sector entities became more informed
about the extent of the market, they would have been encouraged to enter it by
building their own data processing facilities. The original franchisee would
undoubtedly have continued to compete as other data processors entered the
market. At some point this original franchisee would no longer have received
government support.
Should no one have stepped forward even to respond to the RFP, the
government could have insured that this data be made available to society at


























































































build the data processing facility. The government could have used its
standard procurement process to select a contractor to build and operate the
system using the trust fund monies. In the method of selection of the
operator, one of the criteria would have been the contractor's commitment to
buy out the trust fund at some tire in the future, that is, pay back the
initial trust fund monies. This meant that when the trust fund had been
repaid, this option became the one discussed previously.
In the trust fund model the government would not only have set the raw
data price but would also have set the market price and the contractor
operator would have received a fixed profit just as contractors receive today
for operating governmental facilities. If the market developed and appeared
to be greater than initially expected, there could have been incentives that
induced the private sector operator to buy out the trust fund and tu.n the
operation into a private sector activity. Examples of incentives were
discounts for early retirement of the trust fund and decreasing royalty fees.
See Figure 6.
All of the issues discussed above would hgoe to have been addressed in
going forward with this type of activity. What this discussion points out is
that even with a relatively small amount of private sector participation, a
number of institutional options exist wherein the government could induce
participation.
2.	 A Private Sector Proposition
A private corporation suggested that it use its own capital resources to
build Stereosat, launch it, build the ground data handling system, and develop
the marketing organization. The government would have had to guarantee to
provide at least three-quarters of the revenues necessary to build and operate
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paid the subsidy, a long term purchase agreement, until the raw data, to
specification, was being transmitted by the satellite. If the satellite
failed, either in not transmitting data or not meeting the specifications for
the data, the government was not obligated to pay anything. In return for
providing this guaranteed underwriting, the private corporation would have
archived the data for the government. To effectively have created a market,
the private corporation would h rv: needed to be able to market to government
agencies -Who are significant users of this data. By providing the under-
writing, the government would have insured that Stereosat was implemented and
the images would have been available.
If the market was in fact significant, then the amount of subsidy
required to be provided by the government would have been reduced over time
until there was no need for it. The government could have required the
private corporation to repay the entire uiJ erwriting, or might have viewed the
underwriting as a nonrecoverable sunk cost in procuring the Stereosat
capability for the country.
This proposition was interesting in that it had much cleaner lines of
responsibility than the trust fund option. Here the private sector entity
assumed all of the risk of getting the spacecraft to the point of delivering
data. If the spacecraft failed and no data was delivered, then the government
would not pay. The private corporation thus assumed all the technical risk.
What the private corporation diJ not assume was all the market risk. This
proposition was, in fact, a direct underwriting with the private corporation
being selected as the "chosen instrument" to implement Stereosat. The
government would have created a monopoly in a legal and temporal sense should
it have undertaken this proposition.
-63-
It should be acknowledged that even though a particular private
corporation made this proposition, other industrial organizations would
undoubtedly have been interested in participating. The government would have
to have developed some selection criteria and a method for choosing the entity
or entities which would have been invited to participate.
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SECTION IV
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the legal and institutional analysis was to identify those
constraints which may have impacted on a decision to create a new
institutional arrangement wherein the private sector and government would have
participated in a joint venture tr implement the Stereosat mission. Included
in the types of constraints considered are existing law, procedure, and
administrative regulation. Another set of issues deals with interagency
concerns with respect to their particular charter and scope of concern. A
third set of issues deals with the interface between government and private
sector decision making. Although there may be issues other than the ones
herein discussed, these issues are considered to be those potentially having
had the greatest impact on the implementation of the Stereosat mission. It
should be noted that some of these issues are entirely domestic in character
while others are both domestic and international.
B. OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 196761
The cardinal principle under which the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was
signed is the freedom of "exploration and use" of outer space "by all states
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance
with international law. 1162 The one limitation oa this provision is that the
61	 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 4 N.T.S. 205 (1/27/67)
62	 Article 1, paragraph 2.
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exploration and use must be carried out for the "benefit and in the interest"
of all countries irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific
development. 63 This later provision has become known as the "common
interest" clause, and has been regarded as requiring the states to share
benefits not in any specific manner but rather as an expression of the general
desire that the benefits be generically beneficial. 64
 When this paragraph
of the treaty was analyzed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
as it engaged in its constitutional function of giving its advice and consent
to the President, the committee formally stated that "nothing in Article 1,
Paragraph 1 of the Treaty diminishes or alters the right of the United States
to determine how it shares the benefits and results of its space
activities." 65 It is clear that the availability of a consistent set of
stereoscopic images of the Earth's surface falls within the beneficial common
interest provision of the Outer Space Treaty.
The Outer Space Treaty mandates that signatories to the Treaty shall be
responsible for all activities in space whether carried on by governmental
agencies or by nongovernmental entities. The activities of nongovernmental
entities shall require "authorization and continuing supervision" by the
signatory nation. 66 This provision has become known as the "control and
supervise" provision in the treaty. The question raised is, "What constitutes
appropriate authorization, control and supervision?" For example,
63	 Article 1, paragraph 2.
64 S. Gorove, Freedom of Exploration and Use In the Outer Space Treaty, 1
Denver J. Intl L. and Pol. 93 at 104 (1971).
65 Treaty on Outer Space, Report, 90th Congress, lot Session, Executive
Report Number 8, page 4 (April 18, 1967).
66	 Article 6
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if a private sector entity were to undertake Stere, sat as a totally private
venture, procuring the satellite, buying a launch from NASA, and operating the
system itself and selling the data products, what responsibility and what
management would the federal government be required to implement to meet the
requirements of the treaty mandate? Does this require Congressional action?
Is it appropriate to treat this private sector entity as a corporation subject
to regulation by an agency such as the Federal Communications Commission? The
impact of this "control and supervision" on possible models for joint private
sector/government institutional structures is discussed later in the report.
The issues of the extent and the boundaries of what constitutes "control and
supervision" under the terms of the Treaty are discussed in Appendix 3.
The Outer Space Treaty also raises an issue with respect to access to
earth observation data once collected and available for dissemination. U.S.
policy has been and continues to be that all data will be available to
anyone. 67 In the case of Landsat, imagery is available to any and all
purchasers ::ho pay the cost of reproduction of the data. For Stereosat the
data would probably have to be available to any person who would be willing to
pay the cost of the images or the CCTs. Fundamentally, there must be non-
discriminatory access to the earth observation data.
A separate but related issue is exclusivity of the data. For a private
sector entity to enter into the earth observation arena, that entity must have
some way to protect its investment. For some joint private sector/government
institutional models, the private sector organization must be able to collect
the data from the satellite in an unique and exclusive way and be able to
insure that it is the only collector of the raw data. In the case of Landsat,
67	 PD-42.
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there are today foreign ground stations which can receive data and reproduce
it under license from the U.S. government. The technological solution for
Stereosat raw data, in some of the applicable institutional models, is to
encode it on the satellite and decode it at the ground station. Encoding the
raw data does not appear to run afoul of the Treaty, as long %a there is
nondiscriminatory access to the final data product. U.S. policy on supporting
direct foreign readout of data may preclude restricted access.68
A thornier issue is one which deals with controlling the exclusive nature
of the data once it is disseminated to purchasers. This issue is not directly
related to the Outer Space Treaty and is discussed below.
C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Earth observaton data has in the past only been collected by the federal
government under the auspices of its research and development activities,
primarily carried out by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). There has been no need to provide intellectual property protection
for this data since it is in the public domain and freely available to
everyone. However, now that it appears that some earth observation systems
may b_^ commercially operational, before an investor would commit funds to
participate in a earth observation space venture, he must be assured of
protecting that which is of value and which provides his return on inv.atment;
68	 PD-54 saes:
"c. International Participation. The United States will generally
support non-discriminatory direct readout to foreign ground stations
to continue our present policy and to provide data to foreign users
under specified conditions. Pricing policies must be developed that
are consistent for foreign and domestic users. We will promote
development of complementary nationally operated satellite systems
so as to limit U.S. program costs, but protect against unwarranted
technology transfer." (U)
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the earth observation data itself. It should be noted that the issue here is
not access to the data. Any private sector participant in an earth
observation activity would be required to provide free access to the data;
that is, any person wishing to purchase the data would have a right to obtain
that data by paying the purchase price. The issue here is one of controlling
the dissemination of the data in such a why that the investor can capture a
return on his investment. Controlling access to the raw data as it comes from
the spacecraft down to earth has a technological solution; either the data can
be encoded or the spacecraft can only dump data at particular times to a
unique ground station. The more critical problem is controlling the data once
it is sold to a customer. In economic jargon, this is known as the
appropriability problem.
A theoretic policy recommendation made above was to restrict a private
sector entity to that portion of the system that is a natural monopoly.
Assuming for all the reasons earlier discussed that the natural monopoly
encompasses the downlink, the product of the natural monopoly is the raw data
stream. If the monopolist wants to make a return on his investment, he must
have a way to enforce his property rights in the product, the raw data
stream. Once the raw data stream is sold to a data processor, the monopolist
has no effective control over that data or the uses to which it is put. The
monopolist can prohibit each data service from reselling the raw data through
contract provisions. This protective measure may not be effective since the
cost of policing it is high. The monopolist's only sanction is a refusal to
sell raw data to the offending data processor. If that data processor wants
to stay in business, he has an incentive to acquire the raw data in a black
market by broadcasting his willingness to buy. While other data processors,
as organizations, can refuse to participate in the black market as sellers for
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fear of having their own data stream cut off, there is virtually no way, at
reasonable cost, to police the employee who may expropriate the data without
his employer's knowledge. Thus, given these assumptions, the existence of a
black market is a virtual certainty.
The appropriability problem is not solved by the government participating
in the natural monopoly; it is, however, shifted to the data processors where
its effects may more reasonably be reduced. If the government participates in
the spacecraft and the downlink, the natural monopoly, the private sector
participant is guaranteed a return on its investment by the government. For
granting this return on investment, the government assures that the raw data
become available. The private sector participant in the natural monopoly now
has no need to exercise property rights over the raw data.
The data processors will sell the primary data product to end users or to
value added processors, or will sell value added products directly to end
users. Where the data processor is selling the primary data product, stereo
images or CCT's, the data processor faces the same appropriability problem --
keeping subsequent purchasers from undercutting. Since the most likely form
of value added processing is merging Stereosat imagery with other existing
data sets, the unique methodology employed in creating the unified end product
will give it a distinctiveness over which the data processor will have
control. An example is commercial mapmakers. Their common practice is to
make a slight error in each map, one that does not affect the usefulness of
the product. By watching other mapmakers' products and identifying the
deliberate error, their property rights may be enforced. There may be similar
ways to tag Stereosat data.
Where the primary data product is sold, the data processor really only
has resort to a refusal to sell to enforce its property rights. This
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sanction is ineffective where there are multiple data processors. One way to
create a distinctive product, that ie, to protect a property right, is for the
data processor to sell only products that have some value added processing
done to it. This may be some slight enhancement or method of presenting the
data. There may be technological ways to tag the data.
Other than using contract provisions or technological tags, enforcement
of property rights in the data is difficult. Since the government wanted to
attract private sector investment in Stereosat, it could enhance the
attractiveness of the investment by facilitating protection of property rights
in the data. The primary mechanism for enhancing these rights is to provide
legal protection for the Stereosat data. Some protection is already afforded
by the Copyright Act, but the most desirable protection would be specifically
enacted statutory protection.
Copyright
Photographs are protectable by copyright under the 1976 Copyright Act.69
"Copyright protection subsists, ..., in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or a device. Works of
authorship include ... (5) pictorial, ... works.70 A work is "fixed"
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ..., by
or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.71
These statutory provisions make it clear that photographic images and
analyses done using digital data which ultimately take the form of
69	 17 U.S.C., entitled, "Copyrights", Pub. L. 11o. 9'+-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).
70	 17 U.S.C. 102(a).
71	 17 U.S.S. 101.
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photographic images would be protectable under the Copyright Act. The
problem, however, is that once the image is sold by the processor into the
private sector, the processor has no way of guaranteeing that the image is not
reproduced and resold. Without some protection against resale it is doubtful
that a private sector processor would invest funds in an earth observation
system because he has no way of protecting the product he has created.
The undesirability of copyright protection for the stereo imagery is
evidenced by the remedies provided by the act. Three types of remedies are
provided: injunctions 72 , impounding and disposition of infringing
articles73 , and damages and profits 74 . The first prerequisite for any of
these remedies is, of course, that the copyright holder be aware of an
infringement. With data sold into the private sector which is to then be
merged into other data bases, there is virtually no way for the data producer
to ascertain whether or not there is an infringement of the exclusive
copyright.
Ui.der the injunctive remedy, a court may order temporary or final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain
infringement of a conyright. 75 During the course of any infringement
proceding under the Act, the court may order the impounding of any copies or
other articles which are being used to infringe on a copyright on such terms
as may be deemed reasonable by the court until such time as a final resolution
72 17 U.S.C. 502.
73 17 U.S.C. 503.
74 17 U.S.C. 504.
75 17 U.S.C. 502(a).
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is decreed. 76 As part of the final judgment or decree the court may order
destruction or reasonable disposition of the articles that have been impounded
plus any others that might be subject to the final order.77
The statute provides two types of damages and profits. The first is
actual damages and profits wherein the holder of the copyright bears the
burden of showing not only that an infringement occurred but that he suffered
actual damages. The holder has the right to recover the infringers profits
based on a showing of the infringers' gross revenue. The infringer is then
required to prove his deductible expenses and elements of profit attributable
to factors other than the copyrighted work. 78 This means that statutorily
the holder of the copyright has an easier burden to show profits illicitly
gained from infringement of the copyright. The holder must merely prove the
gross revenues of the infringer and then the infringer must show what portion
of that is attributable to deductible expenses. This is contrasted with the
traditional burden wherein the holder would have to show the net profit
impact, that is, to show both gross revenue and deductions.
The act also provides for statutory damages upon the election of the
copyright owner. An individual or multiple infringers are jointly and
severally liable in a sum not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court
considers just. 79 In the case where the holder of the copyright is able to
show that the infringement was committed willfully, the court, in its
discretion, may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum not more than
76	 17 U.S.C. 503(a).
77	 17 U.S.C. 503(b).
78	 17 U.S.C. 504(b).
79	 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(1)
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$50,000. Where an infringer shows that he was not aware and had no reason to
believe that his acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court, in
its discretion may reduce statutory damages to a sum not less than $100.80
The fundamental problem for the data processor in the earth observation
arena will be to meet the burden of showing damage. Even under the statutory
damage scheme, the holder is relying on the court's discretion in the award of
damages. It will be difficult for the holder to demonstrate actual damage in
the situation where one purchaser gives a stereo pair of images to another
person. The question is, "What are the actual damages sustained by that
activity?" In actual monetary amounts, the transfer of a pair of images or
one CCT is probably small. The problem for the private sector investor is not
that he has not sustained damage, but that he must prevent a black market or
free exchange to occur in order to protect his investment. The Copyright Act
as now constituted does not appear to provide sufficient protection.
Therefore, before a private sector investor would come forward he probably
would request statutory protection for this earth observr*.ion data which is
separate and unique from that provided by the Copyright Act.
There are cases under the copyright and patent laws wherein computer
algorithms are now protectable. This is especially important in the earth
observation arena since the technology will probably advance significantly as
more data is handled in a computer mergeable form. Here too, the private
sector investor must be able to prohibit effectively free sse of his product
in a secondary market.
A further problem arises in the international dissemination of this
data. The statutory protection of the copyright exists only within the United
80	 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(2).
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States and its territories. There is an international copyright act to which
the United States is a signatory. It may be possible to enforce copyright
protection against other signatories to the international copyright act, but
there is no guarantee that infringers will be curtailed. Also, it is unclear
what types of damages and remedies are available under that international act.
D. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act, Public Law 93-502, 88 Statutes 1561
(1974), (codified at 5 U.S.C. Section 552), was intended to provide greater
public access to the operation of the federal government. The importance of
the Freedom of Information Act to earth observation data is a function of the
following provisions: "...each agency, upon any request for records..., shall
make the records promptly available to any person." 81
 The agency disclosing
these records may charge a fee; however, "Such fees shall be limited to
reasonable standard charges for document search and duplication and provide
for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and duplication.1182
This provision is operative on the EROS Data Center which provides Landsat
imagery for the co--t of reproduction.
Any institutional arrangement undertaken by the federal government where,
directly or indirectly, the federal government is in possession of Stereosat
data would make the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act applicable.
Thus, the federal government would be in the position of attempting to induce
private sector investment where the maximum price that could be charged to the
ultimate user of the information was the cost of reproduction. No private
81	 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3).
82	 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A).
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sector entity would enter into this type of arrangement. Thus, it appears
clear that any arrangement which involves both the private sector and
government would require an amendment to the Freedom of Information Act. It
should be noted that in the bills in the House and Senate which have been
offered dealing with earth observation data, an exclusion is provided from the
provisions of the Freedom and Information Act. These bills are discussed in
Appendix 2.
E.	 OWNERSHIP ISSUES
Traditionally, when the government enters intr an activity where
government monies are used to provide the capital investment in the system,
the ownership of that system remains in the public domain. It may be operated
by a contractor and may, in fact, have its primary benefit accruing to the
private sector. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is a public
aector activity operated for the primary benefit of the private sector. Where
the government provides all the funding it is clear that facility would be
owned by the U.S. government.
When entering into an institutional arrangement wherein the private
sector would contribute capital dollars, the questions of ownership of the
respective portions of the system undoubtedly arise. It is reasonable to
assert that if the overall system which is untimately created has unique and
identifiable separable segments, then those segments built by the private
sector would undoubtedly remain in the private sector, and those facilities
provided with government funds would remain in the public domain. This would
not dissuade the private sector entity from participating because their return
on investment would be assured from the ope ation of the overall system and
would be based on a smaller capital investment than if the private sector had
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provided the money for the entire system. The private sector entity is still
subject to governmental control and supervision, and regulation.
In the case where there is no easy way to separate that portion of the
system which is paid for by private sector monies and that portion paid for by
public funds, ownership questions become unclear. At the present time there
is no clear resolution of these issues; however, there have been cases of
joint ownership in the past. One way of handling this problem is via a
royalty arrangement which would allow the private sector entity to garner a
return on his investment.
F. REGULATION
In the earlier discussion of the Outer Space Treaty, mention was made of
the need to "control and supervise" private sector entities who might be
involved in earth observation. Once the necessity for some form of regulation
is acknowledged, the question becomes: "Who does the regulation and under what
types of riles?" It is clear that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) is a science, research and development organization and
has no regulatory charter, experience, or mandate. In one 	 he bills to be
discussed above, regulatory responsibility is given to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) based on their responsibility for
communications satellite activities.83 PD-54 appears to give regulatory
authority to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOA?).
83 The FCC has expressed a strong preference not to be given regulatory
oversight of space remote sensing systems. Operational Remote Sensing
legislation: Hearings on S.663 and S.875 before the Subcommittee on
Science, Tecanology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 96th Congress, First Session, Part II, at
254 (July 31, 1979) (statement of Stephen J. Lukasik, Chief Scientist,
Federal Communications Commission).
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There are many subissues contained within the question of regulation
which have not been examined in any great detail. The type, scope, and
character of the needed regulation, should it be required, would have to be
examined once the type of institutional structure for joint private
sector/government participation in Stereosat was decided upon, or at least the
range of options narrowed n a manageable number.
G. ANTITRUST
Antitrust issues should not be a significant factor in creating a joint
private sector/government institutional structure for Stereosat. There are
however, situations wherein questions of antitrust and monopoly power would
have to be addressed. Should the U.S. government undertake to create a
monopolist who would control the processing of earth observation data, then
clearly this entity would have to be regulated by some segment of the
government. There is a general tendency, well-founded and desirable, to not
want to create monopolies but rather to foster competition. Thus an activity
which would result in a monopoly, either legal or temporal (in the sense of
being the first to enter an activity), could be avoided by judicious planning
at the outset.
Another situation wherein antitrust issues may arise is if earth
observation activities, in particular. Stereosat, were to be undertaken
entirely by a private sector entity. Although an individual corporation could
come forward and propose to undertake this activity subject to all of the
strictures discussed above, such as freedom of access, there is no guarantee
that the entity which is either chosen or comes forward would necessarily be
one which would h;- Fe the desirable characteristics. It may be possible that
the type of organization which might be created to act as the processor of the
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earth observation data is a industrial organization, typically a corporation,
created by ultimate end users who would provide private capital in return for
shares in this subsidiary corporation. For example, the major oil companies
could combine together to create a corporation to do this data processing. If
such an organization were created, it is clear that questions of sharing of
data and price fixing amongst the ultimate end users, acknowledging that they
are merely investors in subsidiary corporation, would arise with respect to
whether this is a desirable type of institutional structure to have in the
earth observation arena. These issues are ill-defined at present and require
further analysis.
H. SUMMARY
The discussion above has identified a number of potential legal and
institutional issues that would have had to have been addressed to create a
joint private sector/governmental institutional structure for Stereosat.
There are undoubtedly other legal issues as yet unidentified, and some here
discussed may in fact not be significant issues. The intent of this section
has been to identify those that appear to be significant in the current time
frame.
I. COi;3TRAINTS
This section of the report examines the 	 tential impact of some of the
legal and institutional constraints on the types of institutional structures
which might have been created to implement Stereosat. See Figure 7. Figure 7
displays the legal and institutional issues dean the left c01um4 and the
continur o f organizational structures across the top of a matrix. The impact
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The Freedom of Information Act is not applicable if Stereosat was an all
private sector activity. However, if there would have been be any recovery of
investment, even if the mission were undertaken solely by the government, then
the Freedom of Information Act should be amended. If the data was available
for cost of reproduction only, the Freedom of Information Act does not have to
be amended and is applicable.
Under the Outer Space Treaty pro-ision to "control and supervise," if the
government undertook Stereosat as a traditional space mission, there was no
issue because the government was undertaking the action. If, however, a
hybrid organization or total private sector entity undertook Stereosat, then
the government must have taken some affirmative action to "control and
supervise." This raises the issues of the responsible agency and the extent
of supervision.
If Stereosat was an all government activity or heavily government in the
form of a public trust wherein the monies came from the Treasury, then no
antitrust issues were relevant. However, regulated monopolies and regulated
competitive industries might have encountered antitrust issues with respect to
the designation of these entities as public utilities or common carriers. If
the activity was total private sector, there may have been some questions with
respect to data sharing.
There was no need for intellectual property protection if Stereosat was
undertaken as a governmental activity and the daca were sold for the cost of
reproduction only. In a hybrid organizational structure where there is an
attempt to recover the cost of the system, copyright protection only was
inadequate to protect the recovery of investment, and the government should
have provided some statutory protection to induce the private sector to invest
money.
-81-
Ownership of tt. system in the hybrid types of organizations required
some form of shared proprietary rights, whereas within the private sector the
system would belong to the private sector entity.
The issues identified in Figure 7 were not insurmountable in that they
did not eliminate any organizational options from the number which might be
available. What Figure 7 demonstrates is that for any selected institutional
structure, the government would have had to make appropriate changes in the
existing body of law and procedure.
Considerable work remains to be done to understand the full ramifications
of the types of legislative packages, contractual arrangements,
interdepartmental negotiation and other similar issues which would be required




The Stereosat Policy Study Task was the result of the confluence of two
movements. First, the geosciences industry had identified a worldwide
consistent set of stereo images obtained from a satellite as a pressing
national and international need. 84
 Representatives of the industry
advocated the mission which ultimately became Stereosat before Congress, to
the President's Science Advisor, and to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).
Second, Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), faced
with funding requests for increasingly costly space missions, wanted the end
users who benefit from these missions to contribute to their cost, preferably
up front. Since Stereosat had a readily identifiable end user community, it
became clear that for the mission to proceed some private sector participation
would be essential.
As a result of this desire for a joint private sector/government venture,
the Geosat Committee undertook a study of the potential market for stereo
images. The Geosat Committee document has been widely distributed and has
become the basis for arguments for a NASA commitment to launch a stereo
satellite, and methods by which the costs of such a system might be supported
by the data users. Based on the Geosat Committee market survey there appeared
to be sufficient demand for satellite stereo data to offsat at least some part
of system costs through data sales.
84	 47 U.S.C. 701.
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While it is acknowledged by all persons in the geosciences community that
the availability of stereoscopic imagery is a valuable asset tc mineral
exploration, at this time sufficient data to define the extent of the market
for these products are not available. Potential markets outside the mineral
exploration community are uncertain, and the future of the digital processing
market is more speculative. The Geosat Committee market study is at best a
benchmark for more detailed studies. It is insufficient for a decision to
commit capital investment, either by the private sector or government, with
the expectation of a reasonable return on investment.
It has been argued here that the uncertainty of the market for stereo
imagery was one of the major determinants in the reluctance of the private
sector to invest in Stereosat. As the private sector becrme more informed of
the capabilities of Stereosat, it would have analyzed the market for the
images before making any investment in the system. If the potential return on
investment in Stereosat was perceived to be greater than alternative
investments, the private sector would have made proposals to the government
for implementing Stereosat. That is to say, the private sector would have
participated with government to the extent they perceive an ability to make a
return on their investment.
With the government focusing on evolving an operational remote sensing
system which includes the private sector, Stereosat is not likely to proceed
as an in ependent activity. Stereosat will hays to be evaluated at some time
in the future by both the government and the private sector in the context of
the operational remote sensing system. When the decision is made to proceed,
the issues discussed above will have to be addressed.
This preliminary and cursory examination of the issues associated with
creating an institutional structure for joint private sector/government
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participation in Stereosat ,gay be generic in application. As the government
proceeds with other earth observation activities, these issues with respect to
private sector involvement will reoccur and must be examined in some detail.
Thus, while it is hoped that this document would aid in the decision to
proceed with a private sector/government institutional structure for
Stereosat, it is hoped that the issues identified can be subjected to further
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The Geosat Report was a useful preliminary market assessment for
3	 Stereosat. However, the estimated global requirements for stereo data
products may not even be a good ballpark figure. Some brief comments follow
on selected aspects of the Geosat Report. These involve the disproportionate
importance of a few prospects, the reliability of survey estimates of market
demand, the relationship between Landsat and Stereosat users, the
interdependencies among players, global stereo data products requirements, the
pattern of sales over time and pricing.
Disproportionate Importance of a Few Prospects
The results reported (see Table 4.1) indicate that relatively few
prospects will account for a large proportion of sales. In the exploration
segment, one prospect accounts for 44 percent of that market, while in the
service segment and the government segment it was 78 percent and 73 percent
respectively. This theme is elaborated upon in Figure 1. The overall
accuracy of any estimate of market demand is highly dependent oil accuracy of
the figures given by a very small number of prospects.
Reliability of Survey Estimates of Market Demand
There are three factors to keep in mind when considering the estimates of
market demand. The first is whether or not the prospect knows its true
demand. The second is whether what is the true demand at the time of the
survey will be the true demand at the time the product is available. ,'he
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Let's consider these factors in reverse order. There is a real question
about the truthfulness of the survey estimates of demand by individual
prospects. If one wants the service to be available, one would overstate
one's demand estimate. A counterbalancing influence would be a desire to
maintain one'a credibility with our federal government. This influence would
seem to be most pronounced for domestic government agencies, somewhat less
important for domestic private concerns, and perhaps negligible for foreign
prospects.
The second factor can't be finessed. Intentions are not the same as
behavior. Some might intend to buy and then won't, while the converse might
hold for others. Scant attention seems to have been given to possible
changes, if any, in the future environment.
The first factor is also very important. The prospects might not know
what their true purchases will be. This is hinted at in Table 4.1. Moro- than
a half dozen survey participants stated that split between their domestic and
foreign coverage needs was exactly fifty-fifty. Is this reasonable?
The Relationship Between Landsat and Stereosat Users
The relationship between Landsat and Stereosat users is not completely
clear. Are there users of Landsat information that have no need for Stereosat
information or those who might use Stereosat information who are not using
Landsat information? If so, why and how many?
The Geosat Report in making its worldwide projections assumes a



















While some industrial concerns in the Stereosat Survey might be
classified as foreign, the difference in profiles is striking. The government
component is relatively smaller for Stereosat. Why?
Interdependence Among Players
The Geosat Report does not adequately explore interrelationships among
players. For instance, if exploration companies buy the Stereosat product,
then those leasing mineral rights are essentially forced to buy to maintain
parity. More importantly, some exploration companies be l ong t-) consortium and
are known to share Landsat information (Table 4.3). This raises the issue
that the Stereosat Survey might have overstated the market size because of
"double" counting.
Global Stereo Data Products Requirements
The Geosat Report projects global requirements for stereo data products
in the following manner (Table 5.2). The Stereosat Survey yields an estimate
of demand by the Geosat industrial companies. The Geostat Report then
conjectures that sales to these companies will comprise 80% of total domestic
industrial sales. Total domestic industrial sales is consequently estimated
by multiplying Geosat estimated sales by 1.2 (1.00/8 . 1.25). Then because
domestic industrial sales are about 29% of total Latrlsat sales (Table 5.1),
global requirements are estimated by multiplying fae estimate of total
domestic industrial sales by 3.4 (1.001.29 - 3.4i.
This questimate of the global requirements fo
	
:ereo data products is
very speculative. The survey estimate of the demand by Geosat industrial
companies may be very inaccurate. The Geosat companies may account for a
different proportion of the total U.S. industrial market than assumed.
Finally, no justification is provided for assuming the profile of customers is
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the same for Landsat and Stereosat. Given that these errors are
multiplicative because of the chain ratio forecast of potential, little
reliance should be placed on the estimate of global demand.
Sales Over Time
Cumulative sales of Stereosat data product is likely to be S-shaped.
Initially sales might be low as users make small purchases of the product to
evaluate it. On.e this trial period is finished, sales should increase
rapidly provided that the Stereosat product is satisfactory. Eventually sales
will reach a saturation level as users find themselves purchasing at their
capacities or capabilities. This pattern is shown in Figure 2. Annual sales
would behave over time much like the Landsat sales. (Figure 5.1).
Pricing
No investigation of the sensitivity of demand to price was done. Nor was
any analysis done on the pricing of CCT relative to Film. There are some
indicacots that some purchasers might be price insensitive. Fcr instance,
Italy charges much higher prices for Landsat products than does the U.S. On
the other hand, one expert says that if prices were lower more prospects would
buy a complete set of products. Since not just the quantity sold, but also
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APPENDIX 2
LEGISLATIVELY PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
Three bills have been introduced in Congress which would either
explicitly create an operational earth observation system or facilitate its
creation. The institutional structures created by these bills are examples of
the generic types discussed in the report, and attempt to respond to some of
the identified economic, legal, institutional and public policy issues.
S.663 (Stevenson)
The Earth Data and Information Service Act of 1979, S.663, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), introduced by Mr. Stevenson, would create an Earth Data and
Information Service as an agency of the federal government within the existing
structure of the National Aeronautics and Space Association (N4SA). This bill
is basically a "holding action" to provide for the acquisition and
dissemination of Earth resources data by the federal government until
appropriate institutional mechanisms are investigated so the government can
reach a decision as to whether and how this activity should be transferred to
the private sector.
The bill places this service within NASA by creating a unique
organization l managed by a general manager and a deputy general manager
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
reporting to the NASA administrator 2 . The service would be responsible for
all programs associated with Earth resources observation data 3 . It is
probable, but not clear, that the Earth Data and Information Service (EDIS)
1 Section 7(a).
2 NkECEDING PAGE BL.^,'	 "Arid,Section 6(b)(1)(2).
3 Section 3(7).
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would be responsibile for the services currently provided by the EROS Data
Center.
The unique characteristic of Senator Stevenson's bill is that the service
would operate for a fixed term of up to seven years. Within 180 days of the
end of that interim period the President shall make a recommendation to the
Congress as to the appropriate organizational structure to carry on the
functions of the service. Specifically enumerated within the bill are the
options of a continuing as a federal agency, a government corporation or a
private corporation4.
The bill points out that Earth resources observation systems shall be
regulated by the federal government s , but does not specify the form of that
regulation. Since the service would be an agency within NASA, the government
would be undertaking this activity. The requirements of the Outer Space
Treaty to "control and supervise" would thus be met. However, at the time the
service was to be transferred to the private sector, one of the issues would
be who would continue this responsibility. And, what are the appropriate
mechanisms for that "control and supervision?"
The bill provides for intellectual property protection of the data
wherein "it shall be unlawful for any person to reproduce for sale or
distribution, or to sell or distribute, any data or basic information or
product provided by the service" 6 . The bill specifically incorporates the
fair use doctrine from the Copyright Act 7 . One of the considerations in the






the potential market for and the value of the basic data information
product$ . It is interesting to note that the bill provides for civil
penalties not to exceed $5,000 for each violation9 , but does not provide for
injunctive relief.
Since this is an agency of the federal government there is no need to
consider antitrust issues. However, at tl-- time which the service should be
transferred to the private sector this might become an issue.
The bill provides that there shall be charges, that is prices for the
products, such that at the end of the interim period the income from those
charges, combined with any other income that the service might obtain, will
cover the costs of the service a%clusive of the cost for research and
development, and other types of research carried out by NASA 10 . To allow
this recapture, the bill exempts the data from the Freedom Information Act,
Title 5, U.S.C. Section 552.11
At such time as the organization is a viable entity, the President can
transfer the functions of the service to some other organization. It is
interesting to note that the President may transfer records, property, funds,
personnel, etc. 12
 The question that arises here is whether this is a direct
transfer or whether there would be a recapture of the cost of operating th,:
service up to the time of transfer. In other words, if a private corporation
takes over the activities of this service, does it have to pay the federal
government the fair market value for those properties which are transferred,








This bill makes a fundamental assumption that a market exists and that
within government there are appropriate integrated institutional, managerial,
financial, technical, marketing, functions which would allow this service to
make a profit 13 . It should be noted, however, that NASA specifically lacks
this type of financial and marketing expertise.
S.875 (Schmitt)
The Earth Resources Information Corporation Act of 1979, S.875 9 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), as introduced by Senator Schmitt, would create a
private corporation to establish and operate "as expeditiously as practicable
a commercial Earth resources information service" 14 . This corporation would
be formed by the President appointing incorporators, no later than two years
after the enactment of the act, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, who shall serve as an interim board of directors to file the articles
cf incorporation and arrange for the public offering of stock in the private
corporation.
Once the corporation is officially chartered, it shall be managed by a
toard of directors, three of whom would be appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, from persons among the Earth resources
data user :ommunity. The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior
would eact- appoint one member to the board of directors. These departmental
appointees would not be reviewed by the senate. One member shall be appointed
by the National Association of State Governors, and ten members shall be
elected from the stockholders 15 . The board of directors has the





officers 16 and all of the other activities associated with the formation of
the corporation 17. An interesting feature of Senator Schmitt's bill is that
twenty percent of the shares of the corporation are restricted to government
ownership 18 and foreign ownership is limited to less than twenty percent.
No private holder may own more than ten percent of the shares of the
corporation 19 . These provisions seem to evidence a desire to have the
corporation have as broad an ownership base as possible.
The corporation would be responsible for all of the facets of obtaining
Earth resources data, processing it, and marketing it to the various
sectors20 . This corporation is subject to regulation by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) 21 and as such will have a rate making
hearing characteristic of typical utilities 22 . That is, within the rate
base there shall be allowed various kinds of debt and security instruments
which will be allowed to earn the specified rate of return23.
The duties of the corporation include:
1) "plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and operate itself in
conjunction with foreign governments or their designated entities a commercial
Earth Resources Information service;
2) to take over the responsibility for all of the functions of the Earth
Resources Observation System (EROS) Data Center
3) market earth resources raw and preprocessed data;
4) own and operate the Earth Resources satellites, aircraft and other
appropriate data collection systems,
5) own and operate ground receiving stations; and
6) own and operate infornation distribution ;:enters for the provisions of











The corporation is also mandated to market "value-added" Earth
observation data through a subsidiary distribution corporation 25 . The
security instruments marketed as part of the distribution corporation are
eligible for inclusion in the rate base, but the voting stock of the parent
corporation is not eligible for inclusion in the rate base26.
Intellectual property protection is provided specificially within Section
402(b) wherein it states,
"it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in any
manner other than through the channels of data dissemination established
by the Commission (FCC) and the corporation, to sell or disclose to any
other person and Earth Resources information which is compiled by the
corporation."
This statuary protection is not the same as that afforded by the
Copyright Act. It should be noted that since this is a private corporation it
is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
It is noted in the bill 27 that the corporation created by this Act will
be consistent with Federal antitrust laws. The FCC has been mandated to at
any time report to Congress its concerns with respect to any anticompetitive
practices as they may apply to the Earth Resources Information Service along
with a request for appropriate legislation.28
On its face the bill seems to assume that the requirement to "control and
supervise" as encompassed in the Outer Space Treaty is sufficiently met by the
structure of the board of directors who are largely appointed by the president






The corporation is mandated to provide data and information at a "just
and reasonable price" except where separate Earth resources information
services are required to meet unique governmental needs 29 . Since this is a
profit making corporation it would be expected that this just and reasonable
price would allow for appropriate profits as a regulated industry.
Questions which arise with respect to this corporation focus on what
types of antitrust concerns might be applicable. This bill does not create a
monopoly in its own right. The corporation formed under this bill would
undoubtedly have a monopoly for the term starting when it is created. This,
however, is not a legal barrier to entry of other firms who wish to compete
and provide other kinds of data. It is, in fact, a barrier to entry in that
there will be an established organization who, based on the profits it makes
from the initial activities, which might include Stereosat, would be able to
exercise considerable influen ,e over future activities.
Another question is wb ether or not this corporation would be considered
to be a common carrier and subject to all of the appropriate FCC regulations.
Under the provisions of this bill there would be nondiscriminatory access
to data30 but stati,tory protection for its exclusivity 31 . The Act
provides for up to $20 million in fiscal year 1981 to commence operation of
the corporation 32.
H.R. 2337 (Fuqua)
The Space Industrialization Act of 1979 9 H.R. 2337, 96th Cong., let Seas.






Industrialization Corporation (SIC) to promote and assist in the development
of new products, processes and industries in the space environment. The bill
creates two operative elements. One is a corporation which begins as an
agency of the U.S. government 33 for a term of 120 days34 until such time
as stock is sold and it becomes a publicly-owned corporation. The other is a
federal government trust fund 35 of up to $50 million dollars per year for u
maximum term of two years 36 to provide the initial capital for ventures
undertaken by the corporation.
The corporation is managed by a board of directors 37 , the chairman of
which is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the senate
for a term of five years 38 . Three public sector representatives from within
the executive branch of government are also appointed by the President. Eight
private sector individuals are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the senate, six from the industrial concerns with special expertise
in industrial research and development, one from aerospace research and
development, and one academic 39 . These people serve as long as the
corporation is operating on the trust fund money. At such time as the trust
fund is repaid, excluding certain overhead costs, the corporation would become
entirely private 40 , where upon the board of directors would be elected in











It should be noted at the outset that this Space Industrial Corporation
has a charter such broader than merely the acquisition of Earth resources
information. The corporation functions based on proposals solicited 41 and
unsolicited 42 wherein it provides funds to industrial ventures under a
negotiated management plan to hopefully reduce entrepreneurial risk and create
and support a profitable business enterprise. 43 The corporation would be
repaid from profits if successful 44 , and if the venture were unsuccessful,
the private sector proposer would have to prepare documentation as to what
went wrong45 . The corporation is mandated to evaluate the proposal based
upon the technical and economic viability. The criteria for making selections
among the allocation of the resources of the trust fund are aimed at those
which have high potential benefits as determined by the level of risk, the
potential of recovery of capital and cost sharing46.
Under the provisions of the bill the applicant has the rights to all
intellectual properties until such time as the project is approved 47 . After
that period, the negotiation for the long range management plan of this joint
venture would include agreements with respect to patents, proprietary rights,
and licensing in the use of products and information48.
The applications, proposals, management plans, or financial or assistance










Information Act, Title 5 0 U.S.C. Section 55249 . However, if the corporation
were to undertake Earth observation using Stereosat, there is no specific
exemption of that data fr m t hus Freedom of Information Act.
There is no discussion of potential antitrust issues in this type of
activity.
The "control and supervision" requirements are evidently met by the
structure by the board of directors of the corporation, while it functions
using the trust fund. At such time as the trust fund is repaid and the
corporation becomes a private entity, there would be a question of continuing
"control and supervision."
At the time the corporation becomes a private entity, there would be a
question about continuing royalties and agreements.
Summary
These bills attempt to create an institutional structure under which
Stereosat could be implemented. They also attempt to confront some of the
issues which will constrain the structure created. It is not clear that any
of these proposals can meet the goals and objectives of Stereosat. In
particular, they do not enhance the flexibility of the private sector in
responding to Stereosat. Also, it is difficult, given the lack of a
consistent comparative methodology, to assess the benefits and detriments of
each vis-a-vis the others. Therefore, in keeping with the "wait and see"
recommendation discussed earlier, it may be appropriate for Congress to "go
slow" in moving these bills towards passage and implementation. However,
should Congress wish to move forward, roe bills should be drafted to be








Brig. General USAF (retired)
of Counsel
Ha£f-1r b Alterman
Yashi-agton, D. C. 20036
August 9, 1979
Situation
It is anticipated that Stereosat will provide third dimensional remote
sensing earth imagery with a 15 meter instantaneous field of view (IFOV)
resolution from a satellite in a sun synchronous 713-kilometer orbit. The
Stereosat mission, in whole or part, may be undertaken by the government or by
a joint private sector/government enterprise.
The present inquiry is addressed to the requirements in the 1967 Space
Law Treatyl
 and applicable to the described, but as a nongovernmental, space
activity.
Response
The Stereosat satellite orbit would clearly be in free outer space above
the limits of subjacent states' sovereignty or jurisdiction 2 . If launched
by the United States, its authorization and supervision over the activity is
required. "Supervision" would be satisfied by issuance of regulations, by
inspection, submission of required filings and reports and by investigation.
It is the U.S. position that under the 1967 Treaty, there would be no
limitation. on the fineness of the image resolution unless imposed by the
United States or subsequent international agreement.
The Space Law Treaties
The 1967 Space Law Treaty does envisage commercial activity in space. At
Treaty on Principles Governi
	
the Activities of States in the
Ex oration and Use of Outer ace Including t e Moon an Ot er
Celestial Bodies. It UST 24 , T LAS 6347 , 610 UNTS 205.
2	 Ibid., Article II. Objects at an altitude permitting orbit of the earth
are regarded as in outer space.
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the time of its drafting, the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT)
was already organized and operating commercial communications satellites. It
is Article VI of the Treaty that provides, "activities of non-governmental
entities in outer space ... shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the State concerned." The Treaty's formulation was by the
Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations' Committee on the Peaceful Use of
Outer Space (COPUOS). The quoted wording here concerned was taken from a
prior 1963 Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly 3 setting forth "legal
principles" for the "guidance" of member states. In the Subcommittee's
consideration of this principle, a predecessor recital presented by the Soviet
Delegate stated: "All activities of any kind pertaining to the exploration
and use of outer space shall be carried out solely and exclusively by States
..."4 . Subsequently, in a discussion of private activity under
"supervision" of a parent State, the Soviet delegate remarked:
"The Soviet delegation considers it essential to point out
that in this field it would be possible to consider the
question of not excluding iron the declaration possibility of
activity in outer space by private companies, on the condition
that such activity would be subject to the control of the
appropriate State and the State would bear international
responsibility for it"5
The final wording prop3sed, and accepted, was that proffered by the
Soviet Union for Article VI previously recited herein, except for the
3	 UN Resolution 1062 (XVIII), December 13, 1963.
4	 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L/1., June 6, 1962, par. 7.
5	 UN Doc. A/AC.105/PV.22, October 10, 1963 9 p. 23.
I
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substitution on suggestion of the United States Delegate of the term
"non-governmental entities" for "non-governmental bodies corporate".6
As to the U.S. obligation emanating from the "authorization and
continuous supervision" requirement, the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, in March 1967 9 was advised:
it ... a nation which becomes a party to the treaty agrees to be
responsible for space activities carried on by any ... non-governmental
entity. For the United States, this means that the government would
accept responsibility for the activities of ... the Communications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), etc. Furthermore, the government would
see that such activities conform to the Treaty's provisions, and also
authorize and continuously supervise the space activities of
non-governmental entities."7
With authorization and supervision, the nongovernmental entity may
undertake in space any peaceful activity that its sponsor State could lawfully
undertake. The four present space law treaties contain several provisions as
to general and specific activities of States. Whether an activity may be for
profit is a matter for domestic and not international determination. The
problem, in any given case, is whether the activity is one the sponsor State
may undertake under the Space Law treaties.
Pursuant to U.N. General Assembly resolutions, the Legal Subcommittee of
COPUOS is giving priority and detailed consideration of the legal implications
of remote sensing with the aim of formulating draft principles$.
6	 UN Doc. A/AC.105/PV.24 contains vc.batim record of Legal Subcommittee
meeting. Par. 5 of proposal becomes par. 5 of UN Res. 1962, see note 3,
supra., and subsequently Art. VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
7	 Senate Committee Print, 90th Congress, lat Session, March 1967, of Staff
Report for Committee on Aeronautical a,id Space Sciences, U.S. Senate,
entitled "Treaty an Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies - Analysis and Background Data."
8	 UNGA Res. 33/16, Nov. 17, 1978, par. 4(a).
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The USSR and some other States propose inclusion of a principle that
every State has the right to declare that certain types of primary data and
analyzed information 9 , obtained by remote sensing of its territory, may not
be published or given to third States without its express consent. An
example, frequently stated, is that such declaration of the sensed State may
relate to primary remote-sensing data with a spatial photographic resolution
limit of 50 meters and to analyzed remote sensing information obtained on the
basis of such data. The reason generally recited for such limitation is that
dissemination of data with a finer resolution might adversely affect the
economic and/or defense interests of sensed States.10911912
It has been the consistent United States position that its Landsat
program is pursuant to recitals of the 1967 Space Law Treaty, particularly
that in Article I, viz: "Outer Space ... shall be free for exploration and
use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality
and in accordance with international law ..." 13 It is also within the
9	 For definition of terms, see U7 Doc. A/AC.105/240, App. A, 10 Apr. 79.
10 The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS in its 1978 report
noted "that according to experience gained so far in comparing the
imaging capacity of photographic systems and scanner systems, the ratio
between the photographic spatial resolution and the instantaneous field
of view (IFOV) of a scanner as well as television resolution was
approximately between two and three to one" (UN Doc. A/AC.105/216, March
6 0 1978, p. 7, par. 25). Further study towards clearer understanding of
various "resolutions" is under way. Certainly, there is more interest in
spectral resolution than geometric resolution.
11	 UN Doc. A/AC.105/240 9 Apr. 10, 1979 (Report of Legal Subcommittee,
COPUOS, Annex I, App. B, p. 12; USSR Working Paper 1, Working Group III
(1979), re Principle XVI of Remote Sensing Draft).
12
	
	 UN Doc. A/AC.105/28, February 26, 1979 (Report of the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee COPUOS), Annex I, p.3, par. 14.
13	 OR.cit. note 1
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recitals of Article I that States' space activities are to be for the benefit
and interest of all countries and of Article VI that States conducting
activities in outer space "inform the public and the international scientific
community, to the greatest extent possible and practicable, of the nature,
conduct, locations, and results of such activities ..." While the USSR and
some other states contend that failure to obtain a sensed State's consent to
dissemination of sensed data of such state is a violation of the sovereignty
of such State under international law14 , Landsat imagery is being acquired
and beneficially used by most countries. At the recent 1979 meeting of COPUOS
(June 18-July 3), the U.S. Representative, Neil Hosenball (General Counsel,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration), on June 20, 1979, stated:
" ... the absence of any regime requiring the prior
consent of sensed state before dissemination of data from such
systems as Landsat or Seasat or information derived therefrom
has been crucial to the success and wide acceptance the
programs have experienced. We know of no adverse effects to
any State resulting from the absence of a prior consent
regime. We can foresee serious impediments and inequities
arising if restrictive regimes are imposed which impede the
flow of useful date on the natural resources of the earth and
environment ..."15
Nevertheless, the lack of consensus within the Legal Subcommittee,
COPUOS, on the issue of freedom of exploration of outer space versus national
sovereignty over natural resources is the major reason for incompletion by the
14	 See, Zhukov, G.P., Dr., "International Law Problems Related to the
Exploration of Earth Resources from Outer Space", Proceedings of the
Nineteenth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Anaheim, California,
October 12-15, 1976. Distributed by Fred B. Rothman 6 Co., Littleton,
Colorado 80123.
15	 Press Release, US Mission to the UN (USUN-61(79)), June 20, 1979.
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Legal Subcommittee of its charge to complete its draft of principles on remote
sensing of the earth.16
Other provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty are apropos to
consideration of "control and supervision." The recited requirement for the
State's "authorization and continuing supervision" of a nongovernment entity
in space is immediately preceded in Article VI by a sentence imposing
"international responsibility for national activities in outer space ...
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are
carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty"17
Article VII of the Treaty imposes "international liability" upon the
State party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object
into outer space for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its
nationals. The later 1972 "Liability Treaty" 18 imposes "absolute liability"
upon a launching State "for damage caused by its space object on the surface
of the earth or to aircraft to flight." 19 Liability for damage to another
object in space would be based upon "fault". Thus, the U.S. would be liable
16 The COPUOS and its subcommittee arrive at its determination on the basis
of "consensus", that is, there is no vote taken on issues. Where
objections to proposals are made, discussion follows in an attempt to
obviate the objection or to arrive at an acceptable compromise. A
consensus is obtained when all persons raise no further objections.
While a delegate may "abstain , it does not negate a zonsensus otherwise
obtained. Hence, when a consensus is finally attained on a recommended
draft agreement, UN concurrence, signature by States and ratification
generally rather quickly follow.
17	 Op. cit., note 1.
18 Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29,
1972. 24 UST 2389, TIAS 7762, effective October 9, 1973.
19	 Ibid., Art. 1I.
-114-
to foreign governments and its nationals for damages sustained by impacts of a
privately owned Stereosat satellite from space.
Article VIII of the 1967 Space Law Treaty provides that tl a State on
whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried "shall retain
jurisdiction and control over such object, and any personnel thereof while in
outer space." Further, that ownership of objects launched into outer space
"is not affected by their presence in outer space ... or by their return to
the Earth ...". Under the above, a nongovernment entity would retain legal
title to all its equipment in outer space. In addition, the United States
would be responsible to provide governing regulations for the security of
privately owned objects or personnel in space, including imposition of
penalties and constraints as may be found necessary to assure compliance with
its regulations. A State permitting its nationals to engage in space activity
retains its responsibility to assure that such activities are in compliance
with the State's obligations under the Treaty, such as, ensuring that the
activities will be conducted with due regard to the corresponding interest of
other States and will avoid harmful contamination of space and any adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth from introduction of extraterrestrial
matter.20
The 1979 meeting of COPUOS reached a consensus on a draft "Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and on other Celestial
Bodies." It Ls here interesting to note that Article XIV of the draft
Agreement imposes similar "authorization and continuing supervision" language
to that of Article VI of the 1967 Space Law Treaty relative to activities of
20	 1967 Space Law Treaty (Op. cit., note 1), Art. IX.
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nongovernmental entities. 21 The U.S. Delegate to the meeting has orally
advised the author ti^at there was no explanatory paper to this wording of
Article XIV, but that it was in fact patterned after Article VI of the 1967
Space Law Treaty.
Meaning of "Authorization and Continuous Supervision"
In the "Analysis of Treaty", the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences stated that under Article VI of the 1967 Space Law Treaty the
government must "authorize and continuously supervise the space activities of
non-governmental entities." It cites the then existing US/COMSAT relationship
as such an example, viz: "The relationship between the U.S. Government and
COMSAT is already defined in the U.S. Communication Satellite Act of 1962
concerning government supervision, including international aspects and the
role of the Secretary of State."22
The most recent Black's Law Dictionary, defines "supervisor": "in a
broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct." It
21	 A/AC.105/L.113, July	 , 1979 (no "date" yet available as report
currently in printings. Article XIV provides:
"States Parties to this Agreement shall bear international
responsibility for national activities on the moon whether such
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Agreement.
States Parties shall ensure that non-governmental entities under their
jurisdiction shall engage in activities on the moon only under thee
authority and continuing supervision of the appropriate State Party."
22	 Op. cit., note 7. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Pub. L.
87-62 ; 76 Stat. 419) directed the President to "provide for continuous
review of all phases of the development and operation." The FCC and NASA
were also given directed responsibilities (Section 201). COMSAT was made
subject to the District of Columbia Business Act of 1934 as amended. By
Ex Or 11191, January 4, 1965 (30 Fed. Reg. 29), President Johnson made
specific delegations of his responsibilities under the Act.
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Fthen defines "superintend" as "to regulate with authority." 23 A vintage
court decision construing the supervision responsibility of the Secretary of
Interior relating to public land under Revised Statutes, Section 441, stated:
"Webster says 'supervision' means to oversee for direction, to superintend, to
inspect, as to supervise the press of correction." It was said by the Court
to be "so used" in the statute "and hence the statute gives the Secretary, and
under his direction, the Commissioner, of General Land Office, the power to
review all the acts of the local officers, &-I to correct and direct a
correction of any error".24
Certainly, each head of c government department or agency has supervision
over the agency and the public programs it administers. Rules or regulations
are published to govern particular programs. The Administrator of NASA in the
performance of his functions, is given authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to govern undertakings to carry out the purpose of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 25 Compliance is generally assured by
consultations, inspections and by investigations of reported discrepancies.
There is nothing in the negotiated history of Article VI of the Space Law
Treaty to warrant a construction that the words used were intended differently
than their common accepted meaning. Under the 1967 Space Law Treaty,
governments are recognized as authorized to undertake space activities either
through its agencies or through nongovernmental entities for whose actions the
government is responsible. The supervision required is to assure action
23	 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. West Publishing Co., 1979.
24	 Van Tongeren v. Heffernan, 38 N.W. 52, 56, 5 Dak. 180.
25	 Sec. 203c(1). See also 18 USC 799 providing criminal penalties for
violation of NASA A ministrator's security regulations.
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undertaken is in compliance with the government's obligations under the space
treaty. 26 Unless the vesting of supervision is specifically limited, it
would be a continuing responsibility. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has a continuing responsibility of assuring compliance with
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio Regulations, promulgated
under the International Telecommunication Convention, 1973. Under the
responsibility and authority given in the Communications Act of 193427 , it
implements the ITU regulations requiring various filings of FCC approval such
as a request to construct a communication satellite and again later for its
itse and even its launching into space. Any satellite transmitting digital
signals to earth, including stereosat, would be subject to FCC jurisdiction.
It undertakes investigations upon its own motion, or upon complaint when a
user appears not to be in compliance with regulations; for example, not
operating within assigned frequencies. Today's businesses are subject to
regulations set forth in many statutes and/or prescribed by many government
corporations relating to their incorporation and operations, and requiring
sundry filings. In a sense, the provisions here provide for further
requirements for compliance.
26 The Administration will this September introduce a bill to revise the US
Criminal Code. Included therein will be provisions applicable to space
flight. This will be accomplished in part by defining the term aircraft
as "any craft designed for navigation in air or in space." Thus many
offenses in space would be embraced within the recitals pertaining to the
"special aircraft jurisdiction" to be established by the bill. Further
coverage would result from recitals in a section on "Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction."
27	 47 U.S.C. 152 9 303.
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An Operational Remote Sensing System
A White House press release of June 20, 1978 28 9 advised of the
establishment by Presidential Directive of a National Security Council (NSC)
Policy Review Committee (PRO, chaired by the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology (OST), Dr. Frank Press, to provide a forum to review
proposed space policy issues. Initially, the PRC was asked by the President
to review the nation's civil space program. National policies were also
established by the President's Directive. Space principles set forth therein
included, among others, the development and operation on a global basis "of
active and passive remote sensing operations" in support of national
objectives, and:
"the encouragement of domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities and systems for economic benefit and to promote
the technical position of the United States; however, all
United States earth-oriented remote sensing satellites would
require U.S. Government authorization and supervision or
regulation."
Based on a four months interagency review following issuance of the White
House June 20th Memorandum, the White House on October 11, 1978 announced a
U.S. Civil Space Policy 29 which, among other recitals, would " ... provide
for the private sector to take an increasing responsibility in remote sensing
and other applications" and "confirm our support of the continual development
of a legal regime for space that will assure its safe and peaceful use for the
benefit of mankind."
28	 Reprinted in Sen. Doc. 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. "Space Law - Selected Basic
Documents" 2nd Edition (Committee print for Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation) Dec. 1978, n. 558.
29	 Ibid., p. 561
3
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The October 11th memorandum reflected the President's decision to
continue to provide data from Landsat "for all class of users." Further, that
operational uses of data from the ex •.,^erimental system will continue. Specific
details of the Landsat system, including organisational factors, were to
evolve over several years to include development of the potential to involve
the private sector. A comprehensive plan including the private sector was to
be explored for an integrated national remote sensing system.
A Policy Review Co®ittee (Space) task force on "Private Sector
Investment Study", under the co-eaaiaaanship of Arnold Frutkin, NASA, and
Wilbur Eskite, NOM, has c ansidered options for an operational remote sensing
system from leaving it it goven►iment to turning the system over to comsercial
enterprise. This consideration included intermediate options of private
sector investment and involvement. The task force report was submitted to the
Council's Director on June 16th but has not yet been released.30
In the "Science and Technology Message of the President" transmit'.,sd to
the Congress on March 27, 1979 9 the President stated that he was "committed to
the continuity of remote sensing data over the coming decade ... 01
Dr. Press b r s testified that the Administration is committed to an
operational remote sensing system. While NASA's Administrator Dr. Robert A.
Frosch advised that the Administration believes that no legislation is
desirable at this time, he has testified that " ... it is clear that our
30 Phone conversation, August 6 9 1979, with Wilbur Eskite, Co-chairman of
Task Force.
31	 At p. 11, of printed message.
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planned program comprises the essentials of progress toward an operational
system of the sort ... 8.663, contemplates. 1132
The reference above to 8.663, of course, is to Senator Stevenson's
proposal introduced on March 14 9 1979 and cited as the "Earth Data and
Information Service Act of 1979". It seeks to establish in NASA an Earth Data
and Information Service to provide earth resources data. It is a government
agency and all its earth-oriented remote sensing satellites are to be
regulated by the Federal Government. The Service will exist for an interim
period not to exceed seven years. Within this period, but not later than six
months before the end thereof, the President is to report to Congress on the
appropriate organizational arrangement best designed to continue the functions
of the Service as a Federal Agency, or a government corporation or as a
private corporation.
It here suffices to say that as 5.663 provides for a Government agency,
the provisions of the 1967 Space Law Treaty as to "authorization and
continuing supervision" would not be applicable. It would, of course, apply
after the interim period if the Congress vested the operational remote sensing
responsibilities in a private corporation.
S.875, 96th Congress, introduced by Senator Schmitt, prov i des for an
operational earth resources system in the form of a private corporation, the
Earth Resources Information Corporation, to be established by the Act. The
FCC is to have regulatory	 over the Earth resources information
service6 . 33 Recitals apparently patterned after the communication Satellite
32 Statement before Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trsnsr ^xtation, April 9, 1979.
33	 Sec. 102(d), S. 875, 96th Congress.
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Act of 1962, direct the President to "provide for continuous review of the
development and operation of an Earth resources corporation authorized under
... the Act." 34 Further supervision is directed relative to international
relationships and utilization of advances in Earth imaging under controls, as
appropriate. The remainder of the measure, in vesting responsibilities in
NASA and the FCC, is also patterned after the COMSAT Act. The government
authorization and continuous supervision requirements of the 1967 Space Law
Treaty would be satisfied under this measure, although it appears that
attempting to expand under Section 102(d) the FCC's normal regulatory
responsibility to general responsibility for the system of V	 i resources
information services envisaged by the Act will meet serious opposition.35
Both Senator Stevenson and Senator Schmitt have stated thr' single
revised compromise bill will be substituted for S.663 and S.875 in the new
session of Congress. Introduction of the substitute proposed is expected in
September.36
34	 Sec. 201(a) 9 S. 875, 96th Congressz
"Earth resources information services," as defined in Sec. 103 of the
proposal, "refers to a system of satellites and other appropriate data
collecting systems capable of monitoring Earth and near-earth resources,
transmitting this raw date to Earth receiving stations, the processing of
this data for use by the user organizations and the distribution of the
processed data to those requesting it." This also to include certain
associated equipment and facilities for tracking, guidance, control and
co®and functions.
35	 Lukasic, Stephen J., Chief Scientist, FCC, on July 31, 1979, testified
that "such regulatory oversight ... be sought elsewhere within the
Federal establishment." of course, he was not referring to normal FCC
responsibilities under ITU Radio Regulations or under the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended. Similar recommendation of not assigning general
regulatory responsibility was given by Mr. Daniel J. Fink, V.P., General
Electric Co., on April 11 9 1979.
36 Stated by Sen. Schmitt in conversation with writer, following Hearing.
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U.R. 2337, introduced by Mr. Fuqua on February 22, 1979, seeks to
establish a Space Industrial Corporation, to promote, encourage, and assist in
the development of new products, processes, and industries, using the
properties of the space environment. The measure basically sets up a
corporation to provide funds to industry for space industrialization projects,
conceivably including remote sensir.^. Initially, the Corporation to be
established would be a Government corporation, but when the Corporate Board,
with the approval of the President, determines that public ownership can
realistically be secured, it undertakes prescribed action to effect such.
When so effected the corporation will be a private corporation. It is not
unequivocal that sufficient supervision to satisfy the 1967 Space Lana Treaty
requirements would exist over private enterprises in space that secured fund
support from the Corporation, notwithstanding their agreement to comply "with
all provisions of this Act and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder", and particularly after indebtedness to the corporation has beet.
discharged. The satisfaction of the treaty obligations for continuous
supervision would appear at least equally tenuous when the Corporation becomes
a private public-owned entity.
Whether a private corporation created by statute and vested with monopoly
over a given space subject, or whether through a Request for Proposal (RFP), a
private corporation is awarded monopoly responsibility over the subject, the
1967 Space Law Treaty requirement for supervision by the government must be
satisfied. As the government is financially responsible for damages to
another State or its inhabitants, it should assure, insofar as feasible, safe
operation of its nationals' space activity, including compliance with the
State's treaty obligations. These include, among others, promoting
international cooperation and understanding, with due regard to corresponding
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interest of other states and to avoid harmful interference with activities of
other States. Consistent therewith, it would be appropriate as conditions for
grant of authorization, to assure nondiscrimination in access to information
obtained, establishment of just and reasonable prices (perhaps supervision of
accounting and ratemaking procedures), and prescribing standards of quality of
product and service rendered. While some of the foregoing may be subject to
discussion, the sponsoring State to comply with the supervision requirement
must issue regulations to govern activities in space and assure compliance
with the State's treat y
 obligations. Regulations could be set forth in the
congressional enactment(s) as well as by government agencies vested with the
required regulatory authority. Compliance may be determined, among other
means, by inspections, filings, reports and investigations.
Congress has broad discretion as to the type of corporation it creates by
statute and to the limitations or freedom it provides the corporation. One
further type that could be tailored, if desired, is a mixed ownership
corporation in which both the government and the private participants own
stock in the corporation, as AMTRAK. This may be a half-way approach for the
start of the desired enterprise with authority provided in the statute for the
corporation to redeem government-owned shares as its profits permit.
The 1978 COPUOS report reflects its view that progress to date suggests
" ... that remote sensing systems would one day, like weather and
communications systems, become operational, and when that occurred, the
use of satellite data could be expected to become an integral part of
national economics and their planning activities.1137
37	 UN Doc. General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-third Session,
Supplement No. 20 (A/33/20).
-124-
Problems and/or Activities for Future Consideration
A number of issues remain to be examined:
1) probable claims of developing States, and perhaps others, to share in
profits of a private corporation engaged in acquisition of Stereosat imagery,
even where the private company is concerned only with enhancing the data.
(Compare, for example, the claim of equatorial states to segments of the
geostationary orbit);
2) need to protect against unauthorized reproduction and sale of
Stereosat imagery;
3) protection of proprietary interest - patents;
4) indemnification insurance arrangements;38
5) survey of government agencies' regulatory authorization and
procedures to assure compliance;
6) whether to recommend the agency or agencies to have responsibility
for authorizing and supervising an operational, not a research and
development, earth remote sensing system (including Stereosat criteria to be
considered);
7) whether to draft or support other drafted legislative proposals, in
whole or in part.
38 See Section 308 ("Insurance and Indemnification") of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Act, F.Y. 1980; Pub. Law 96
(H.R. 1786 now awaiting President's signature).
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